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1. INTRODUCTION
State-sponsored terrorists and rogue dictators are the "bad
guys" which are the leading threats to the United States' national
security and have replaced the old Soviet Union and a China that
is no longer "Red." Conceptually, fighting the new "bad guys" is
not as easy as fighting the old threats: "nuking" the Soviet Union
or China always remained an option. However, the once useful
military force was not designed to deal with the unconventional
threats now posed by drug dealers and terrorists. Force is often
an inappropriate way to contain or crush some dictators. Accord-
ingly, the United States is increasingly inclined to turn to a new
weapon, international trade measures, and to use this weapon uni-
laterally, regardless of opposition from its allies and trading part-
ners. For example, to fight the reputed godfathers of interna-
tional terrosism, Iran's mullahs and Libya's Muammar Qaddafi,
the United States enacted the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act in
1996 ("ILSA").'
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The new threats to the United States' national security, and
the highly controversial legislation the United States has enacted
to preserve national security, raise a fundamental problem for in-
ternational trade lawyers, who may be inclined to view the
boundaries of their field as narrow. These boundaries encompass
tariffs, non-tariff barriers, trade remedies such as antidumping,
countervailing duty, and escape clause actions. The expansion of
international trade has begun to encompass labor and environ-
mental issues. What about national security? Many international
trade attorneys have asked themselves what is the relationship be-
tween national security and international trade law.
Initially, there may appear to be no relationship between na-
tional security and international trade law. "National security"
often conjures up images of the military, intelligence operations,
and a shadowy world of cloak-and-dagger espionage. On the
other hand, "international trade law" triggers thoughts of a highly
technical, somewhat arcane set of rules involving an ever-
increasing number of economic sectors which are derived from an
international bureaucracy in Geneva, the World Trade Organiza-
tion ("WTO").2 Our senior policy makers embody these stereo-
To be sure, there are other important national security sanctions statutes in
effect. Moreover, there are a number of additional recently-enacted controver-
sial sanctions statues. For example, to fight Fidel Castro, in 1996 the United
States enacted the Helms-Burton Act (formally known as the"Cuban Liberty
and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996"). See Pub. L. No. 104-
114, 110 Stat. 785, (codified at amenfdedat 22 U.S.C. % 6021-91). Guidelines
and implementing regulations for the Helms-Burton Act have been published.
See Cuban Assets Control Regulations; Indirect Financing in Cuba, Civi[ Penalties,
61 Fed. Reg. 37,385 (1996); Guidelines Implementing Title IV of the Cuban Lib-
erty and Democratic Solidarity Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,655 (1996); Summary of the
Provisions of Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTADfAct of 1996, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,955 (1996).
For a fascinating consideration of the Helms-Burton Act in relation to the
major tenets of liberal international relations theory (namely., promoting eco-
nomic interdependence, international law, international institutions, and de-
mocracy), see David P. Fidler, LIBERTAD v. Liberalism: An Analysis of the
Helms-Burton Act from within Liberal International Relations Theory, 4 IND.
GLOBAL L. STUD. J. 297 (1977). For another example of America's use of the
trade sanctions weapon for national security purposes, in this case to fight for-
eign drug kingpins, see the 1986 Narcotics Control Trade Act, Pub. L. No. 99-
570 S 9001, 100 Stat. 3207-164 (1986) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. SS 2491-
95). For a detailed discussion of the complex statutory scheme, see RAJ BHALA
& KEVIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE LAW ch. 12 (1998).
2 See generally RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: CASES AND
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types about national security and international trade law. Few, if
any, Presidential national security advisors have had much experi-
ence with, knowledge of, or even interest in the world trading
system and international trade law. We do not imagine U.S na-
tional security advisors, such as Henry Kissinger or Zbigniew
Brzezinski, as operating in the same arena as our phenomenal in-
ternational trade negotiators, such as Carla Hills or Mickey Kan-
tor.
In fact, however, national security and international trade law
are closely linked, and this link has existed ever since the birth of
modern international trade law in 1947. The link between these
two arenas is contained in the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade ("GATT"). Article XXI of GATT establishes a broad
framework for imposing international trade measures for national
security purposes. Since GATT was enacted in 1947, countries
have occasionally implemented trade sanctions, sometimes invok-
ing Article XXI as a justification for such action. During the
Reagan, Bush, and Clinton Administrations, the United States has
relied on Article XXI to support the unilateral enactment of
highly controversial sanctions legislation. The rationale behind
such legislation is "national security," but virtually all of our trad-
ing partners have balked at this rationale.
This Article assesses GATT Article XXI and the ILSA. It also
assesses the extent to which sanctions statutes such as the ILSA ac-
tually operate. Section 2 of the Article examines the use of trade
sanctions for the purposes of national security under GATT.
Furthermore, Section 2 highlights the constraints, or lack thereof,
Article XXI places on a WTO Member regarding national secu-
rity sanctions legislation. Section 3 examines U.S. trade legisla-
tion with regard to the preservation of national security. This
Section examines the operation of the ILSA and attempts to de-
termine whether the criticisms of the ILSA by our trading part-
ners are justified. Section 4 assesses the effectiveness of U.S. sanc-
tions legislation by examining empirical evidence on the practical
effect of national security sanctions. Finally, Section 5 provides a
summary of the main points of the Article.
Three themes emerge from this Article. First, GATT Article
XXI is a rather weak restraint on the behavior of WTO Members
with respect to the enactment of national security sanctions. Sec-
ond, while some of the criticisms of the ILSA are legitimate, there
also are meritorious, or at least defensible, aspects to the ILSA
that have not received sufficient attention. Accordingly, neither
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critics nor supporters of the ILSA are entirely accurate. Finally,
the weight of empirical evidence suggests that national security
sanctions, whatever their merits, are ineffectual at best, and coun-
terproductive at worst. Thus, in the end, a pragmatic rather than
ideological approach to linking national security and international
trade law may be prudent.
2. WHAT THE GATT SAYS: AN ASSESSMENT OF ARTICLE XXI
The exception to GATT obligations for national security rea-
sons is set forth in Article XXI of GATT. This exception, while
rarely invoked explicitly, is highly significant and allows the Un-
tied States to maintain an arsenal of national security statutes
which allow for unilateral trade action. Without Article XXI, in-
evitable clashes would occur between unilateral measures adopted
under these statutes, and GATT obligations, such as most-favored
nation treatment, tariff bindings,4 national treatment, and quan-
titative restrictions. 6 These clashes could not be managed by Ar-
ticle XXXV(1)(b) of GATT, which allows for non-application of
the GATT, and thereby allows the imposition of economic meas-
ures such as bans or boycotts.7  To escape application of the
GATT under Article XXXV(1)(b), a ban or boycott must be in-
voked by a non-Member against a Member at the time the non-
Member joins the WTO, or by a Member against a non-Member
at the time the non-Member joins the WTO. Nor could these
clashes be managed by GATT Article XXV(5), which explains
how to obtain a waiver of GATT obligations in "exceptional cir-
cumstances not elsewhere provided for in" GATT. To obtain a
waiver, Article XXV(5) requires a two-thirds majority vote in-
volving more than half of the WTO Members.9 There is no ex-
3 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. I, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-11, T.I.A.S 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, reprinted in RAj BHALA, INTERNA-
TIONAL TRADE LAW: CASES AND MATERLus-DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 59
(1996) [hereinafter GATT].
4 See GATT art. II.
5 See id. art. III.
6 See id. art. IV.
7 See id. art. XXXV.
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ception to this requirement for unilaterally-imposed national se-
curity measures. In sum, Article XXI provides the indispensable
textual basis in GATT for unilateral national security measures.
Article XXI states that:
[niothing in this Agreement shall be construed (a) to re-
quire any contracting party to furnish any information the
disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential secu-
rity interests; or (b) to prevent any contracting party from
taking any action which it considers necessary for the pro-
tection of its essential security interests (i) relating to fission-
able materials or the materials from which they are de-
rived; (ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and
implements of war and to such traffic in other goods and ma-
terials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose
of supplying a military establishment; (iii) taken in time of
war or other emergency in international relations; or to
prevent any contracting party from taking any action in
pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations
Charter for the maintenance of international peace and se-
curity.
10
A careful reading of Article XXI, particularly the italicized
terms, coupled with a consideration of the small body of GATT
jurisprudence on the Article, reveals four key points. First, it is
an all-embracing exception. Second, Article XXI(b) is the most
important and controversial portion of this exception. Third, in
contrast, there are some provisions of Article XXI, such as sec-
tions (a), (c), and possibly (b)(l), which are not, or at least ought
not to be, particularly controversial. Fourth, while a non-
sanctioning and, in particular, a target member can challenge the
invocation of Article XXI by a sanctioning member, this right has
no practical importance. Each of these points is discussed below.
10 Id. art. XXI (emphasis added). For a discussion of Article 86, see 1
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, GUIDE TO GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 609-
10 (6th ed. 1995) [hereinafter 1 WTO].
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2.1. A Comprehensive Assessment
The first feature of GATT Article XXI evident from a careful
reading of its language is that it is an all-embracing exception to
GATT obligations. This point is evident from the first word of
the Article, "[n]othing." Once a WTO Member relies on Article
XXI to implement a measure against another Member, there is no
GATT obligation to which the sanctioning member must adhere
with respect to the target member. This point is further rein-
forced by a 1949 decision of the Contracting Parties in a case
brought under Article XXIII of GATT by Czechoslovakia against
the United States. 1 Czechoslovakia argued that the United States
breached its obligations under Articles I and XIII by its admini-
stration of export licensing and short-supply controls. 12 These
controls, instituted in 1948, discriminated among destination
countries. The United States justified the controls under Article
XXI(b)(ii), arguing they were necessary for "security reasons [and]
applied to a narrow group of exports of goods which could be
used for military purposes." 13 The Contracting Parties rejected
the Czech claim by a vote of seventeen to one, with three absten-
tions.14 In so doing, "the Chairman indicated that Article XXI
'embodied exceptions to the general rule contained in Article
I.," 15 While most of the other fundamental GATT obligations
were not at issue in this case, it is not unreasonable to infer from
the Chairman's statement that if the most-favored nation rule of
Article I is excepted by Article XXI, the other obligations im-
posed by the GATT would also be excepted under Article XXI.
2.2. Why Article XXI(b) is Important and Controversial
By far the most important and controversial portion of
GATT Article XXI is Article XXI(b). In this provision, the word
"it" allows the WTO Member invoking sanction measures sole
discretion to determine whether an action conforms to the re-
quirements set forth in Article XXI(b). Thus, the implication of
the word "it" indicates that no WTO Member nor group of
Members, and no WTO panel or other adjudicatory body, has
See 1 WTO, supra note 10, at 602, 606.
See id.
13 Id. at 602.
14 See id.
15 Id. at 606.
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any right to determine whether a measure taken by a sanctioning
member satisfies the requirements. This interpretation is evident,
for example, in the confident statement of the representative from
Ghana concerning Ghana's boycott of Portuguese goods when
Portugal acceded to GATT in 1961: "each contracting party was
the sole judge of what was necessary in its essential security inter-
est. There could therefore be no objection to Ghana regarding the
boycott of goods as justified by security interests."
16
Based on the interpretation of Article XXI(b) as meaning that
each WTO Member decides for itself what its "essential security
interests" are, four corollary principles may be developed. These
corollaries placed Article XXI(b) among the GATT provisions
that come closest to allowing a member to be a "cowboy."
First, a sanctioning member need not give any prior notice of
impending national security sanctions, nor need it give notice
upon or after the imposition of sanctions.17 In contrast, the Rea-
gan Administration informed the contracting parties of its May
1985 prohibition on imports of Nicaraguan goods and services,
and its ban on exports to Nicaragua of all U.S. goods and services
other than those destined for the organized democratic resis-
tance.1 8 Second, the sanctioning member need not justify its de-
termination to the WTO or its Members. Third, the sanctioning
member need not obtain the prior approval or subsequent ratifi-
cation its measures from the WTO or its members. These three
implications of Article XXI are manifested in a GATT Council
discussion about trade restrictions imposed between April and
June 1982 as a result of the Falklands Islands War.' 9 The EEC
representative stated that the exercise of Article XXI rights
"required neither notification, justification nor approval [sic], a
procedure confirmed by thirty-five years of implementation of
the General Agreement." 20  The U.S. representative made the
point in even bolder terms: "[t]he General Agreement left to each
contracting party the judgment as to what it considered to be nec-
16 Id. at 600.
17 For example, Cuba, not the United States, informed the contracting par-
ties of the trade embargo imposed on Cuba in February 1962 by the Kennedy
Administration. Thereafter the Kennedy Administration invoked Article XXI
as its justification. See id. at 605.
18 See id. at 603.
19 See id. at 600.
20 Id
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essary to protect its security interests. The [Contracting Parties]
had no power to question that judgment." 2'
The fourth corollary principle concerns threatened versus ac-
tual dangers. A sanctioning member may determine its essential
security interests. In the words of the Ghana representative at the
1961 debate discussing Ghana's boycott of Portuguese goods
there is a "threatened by a potential as well as an actual danger.
"
As discussed more fully below, nothing in Article XXI(b) requires
that a sanctioning member face a danger that has manifested itself
in a concrete sense, such as a physical invasion or armed attack,
before imposing a national security measure.
Do these four corollaries, in fact, mean that Article XXI(b) is
a license for a sanctioning member to behave like a "cowboy?"
Although the four corollaries may appear to be such a license,
there are, in fact, two checks that might restrain cowboy behav-
ior. First, it is usually politically prudent for a sanctioning mem-
ber to give prior notice to other WTO Members and to attempt
to garner a critical mass of multilateral acquiescence, if not defacto
support, before using Article XXI. Thus, on November 30, 1982,
after discussing the Falklands Islands crisis, the Contracting Par-
ties adopted a Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General
Agreement setting forth two points about the invocation of Arti-
cle XXI:
1. Subject to the exception in Article XXI:a [concerning
the right to withhold sensitive information], contracting
parties should be informed to the fullest extent possible of
trade measures taken under Article XXI.
2. When action is taken under Article XXI, all contracting
parties affected by such action retain their full rights under
the General Agreement.23
The phrase "to the fullest extent possible" in the first para-
graph does not indicate an obligation on the part of the sanction-
ing member to give notice to the WTO or its Members; rather the
sanctioning member decides whether notice is "possible."
21 Id. at 601 (emphasis added).
22 Id. at 600 (emphasis added).
2 Id. at 606 (emphasis added).
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Moreover, there is no preference expressed as between a priori or
post hoc notice. However, the first paragraph of the Decision re-
flects a consensus view that giving prior notice is not just a matter
of courtesy and respect for trading partners, but also a way to re-
duce friction. Presenting the international community fait ac-
compli with national security sanctions inevitably leads to quarrels
among political allies, with countries that oppose the sanctions
typically arguing that they share the same end as the sanctioning
country, but disagree with sanctions as a means to achieving that
end. These quarrels have exploded into major trade disputes since
the United States used secondary boycotts, thereby penalizing
third party countries (including allied) that trade with or invest in
the target. Although notice is not mandated by Article XXI nor
the Decision, it could take on an increasingly important defacto
role in reducing trade friction if the United States continues to use
ever-more aggressive, innovative, but also extraterritorial, unilat-
eral sanctions.
The second restraint on "cowboy behavior" is contained in
the introductory chapeau to Article XXI(b). A sanctioning mem-
ber is supposed to make sure that its measures are "necessary" for
24 To be sure, the United States is not the first WTO Member to resort to
the use of a secondary boycott. Countries in the Arab League have maintained
a secondary boycott against firms that have relations with Israel. (The signato-
ries to the Pact of the League of Arab States, entered into on March 22, 1945 at
Cairo, are: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emir-
ates, Yemen Arab Republic, and People's Democratic Republic of Yemen). See
II FRANK W. SWACKER ET AL., WoRLD TRADE WITHoUT BARRIERS 586-87
(1996). Regarding the last two signatories, on May 22, 1990, Yemen became a
single sovereign state known as the "Republic of Yemen," which is a member of
the Arab League. The Arab League has maintained the boycott for many years,
though some League members d-o not adhere to it. This boycott is discussed in
the 1970 GATT Working Party Report on the Accession of the United Arab
Republic. In defense of the secondaiy boycott of Israel, the representative from
the United Arab Republic stated it was political, not commercial, in nature, and
resulted from the "extraordinary circumstances to which the Middle East area
had been exposed," including "[t]he state of war which had long prevailed in
that area." Accordingly, the representative concluded, "[i]t would not be rea-
sonable to ask that the United Arab Republic should do business with a firm
that transferred all or part of its profits from sales to the United Arab Republic
to an enemy country." 1 WTO, supra note 10, at 602. Interestingly, an per-
haps somewhat hypocritically in view of the recent use of secondry boycotts
by the United States, the United States enacted blocking legislation making it
ilegal for American companies to comply with the Arab League boycott.
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the "protection" of that member's "essential security interests. "25
For the most part, GATT Contracting Parties exercised restraint
in interpreting these terms, and most WTO Members have also
been cautious. Overall, the number of express or implicit invoca-
tions of Article XXI remains relatively small. Nevertheless, the
potential for abuse exists, and the considerable criticism of recent
U.S. sanction laws would lead some observers to doubt the power
of these terms to continue to act as a restraint on "cowboy behav-
ior." After all, these terms are broad enough to encompass a vari-
ety of circumstances, and their application to a particular set of
facts is subjective. At the same time, these terms are a gauge by
which the world trading community can examine a sanctioning
member's use of Article XXI(b). In other words, the world trad-
ing community can help shape world opinion as to whether a
sanctioning member is "crying wolf."
Consider Sweden's global import quota system for certain
footwear which was in effect between November 1975 and July
1977. Sweden argued that the:
decrease in domestic production has become a critical
threat to the emergency planning of Sweden's economic
defence [sic] as an integral part of the country's security
policy. This policy necessitates the maintenance of a
minimum domestic production capacity in vital industries.
Such a capacity is indispensable in order to secure the pro-
vision of essential products necessary to meet basic needs
in case of war or other emergency in international rela-
tions.
26
In fairness to the Swedish argument, it is true that, as one
Contracting Party said during the discussion of the 1949 action
brought by Czechoslovakia against the United States, Article XXI
covers "goods which were of a nature that could contribute to war
potential."27 In other words, for instance, it would be reasonable
to include within an export control measure a software program
or hardware device that is not itself used for a military purpose,
but which can be converted to that purpose.
25 See GATT art. XXI(b).
26 1 WTO, supra note 10, at 603.
27 Id. at 602 (emphasis added).
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However, upon further reflection, the gauge suggested above
illustrates why Sweden's argument is outrageous and causes a
slippery slope. Would buttons for military uniforms be
"necessary" for the "protection" of Sweden's "essential security in-
terests" on the grounds that troops are disadvantaged if they lack
the appropriate attire? More generally, is Article XXI(b) designed
for potential non-military (i.e. economic) threats? If so, then the
United States' three big car manufacturer's (General Motors,
Ford, and Chrysler) could argue that Japanese auto imports
should be banned or severely restricted because of the threat they
pose to market share in the vital passenger car industry. Like-
wise, India could argue that it must enact extraordinary measures
against imported food to ensure it maintains self-sufficiency in the
food industry, especially given its long- standing border conflicts.
These arguments, however, would stretch beyond the scope of
Article XXI(b), making it a commercial, as well as, a national se-
curity exception. In terms of the above arguments, the central
thrust behind Article XXI(b) is the requisite showing of a link be-
tween the U.S. passenger car industry and a national security
threat, or between India's food needs and its traditional nemeses,
Pakistan and China. But, these arguments pre-suppose such a link
and thus become self-fulfilling. There are cases in which commer-
cial and national security interests are so intertwined that a bright
line between the two interests cannot be drawn. Nonetheless, it
must be remembered that regular trade remedies condoned under
other articles of GATT, most notably the escape clause permitted
by Article XIX, exist to deal with non-military threats posed by
fair foreign competition.
As another example of how the gauge can be helpful in de-
liminting Article XXI(b), consider an argument made by Nicara-
gua in a complaint against the United States relating to a Nicara-
guan trade embargo imposed by the Reagan Administration in
May 1985.28 Nicaragua urged that the key terms in the Article
XXI(b) chapeau amounted to a self-defense requirement; that is, a
Member could only invoke Article XXI(b) after it has been sub-
jected to aggression. 9 In the unadopted 1986 report, the GATT
panel felt its strict terms of reference prevented it from ruling on
28See id. at 603 (discussing Executive Order which prohibited all imports of
goods and services from Nicaragua and all exports from the U.S. of goods des-
tined for Nicaragua).
29 See id.
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30this argument. However Nicaragua's argument cannot be right.
If the drafters of GATT meant to include only self-defense cases,
then they would have said so expressly and, perhaps even refer-
enced the language in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.31 Instead,
they used terms that would balance competing interests. This is
evident from the statement of one of the drafters of the original
Draft Charter about the meaning of "essential security interests:"
We have a good deal of though to the question of the secu-
rity exception which we thought should be included in the
Charter. We recognized that there was a great danger of
having too wide an exception and we could not put it into
the Charter, simply by saying: 'by any Member of meas-
ures relating to a Member's security interests,' because that
would permit anything under the sun. Therefore we
thought it well to draft provisions which would take care
of real security interests and, at the same time, so far as we
could, to limit the exception so as to prevent the adoption
of protection for maintaining industries under every con-
ceivable circumstance.... [sic] [T]here must be some lati-
tude here for security measures. It is eally a question of
balance. We have got to have some exceptions. We can-
not make it too tight, because we cannot prohibit meas-
ures which are needed purely for security reasons. On the
other hand, we cannot make it so broad that, under the
guise of security, countries will put on measures which
really have a commercial purpose.
Moreover, the content of clauses (i), (ii), and (iii) that follow
the chapeau to Article XXI(b) indicates that actual aggression is
not a prerequisite.33 Rather, these clauses allow the invocation of
Article XXI(b) to deal with nuclear weapons material, arms traf-
30 See id. at 607.
31 Article 51 provides that "[n]othin& in the p resent Charter shall impair
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack oc-
curs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." U.N.
CHARTER art. 51.
32 1 WTO, supra note 10, at 600.
33 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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ficking, or an international relations emergency. If a sanctioning
member had to wait until a hostile power acquires nuclear weap-
ons, a destabilizing number or type of non-nuclear arms, or a
physical invasion, then it would be too late for trade sanctions to
have any protective effect. In addition, the threat may be orches-
trated by a "military establishment," a term broad enough to in-
clude not just sovereign governments, but also major terrorist or-
ganizations or drug cartels.
At the same time, howevet, implicit in clauses (i), (ii), and (iii),
and in the words "necessary," "protection," and "essential security
interests," must be the concept of a credible threat from these dan-
gers. Simply "crying wolf" will not do, because Article XXI
could not have been designed to protect a hyper-sensitive gov-
ernment any more than many standards of care in tort law do not
protect the hyper-sensitive plaintiff. Rather, the test should be an
objective one, namely, whether a "reasonable" government faced
with the same circumstances would invoke Article XXI. In sum,
it is the implicit concept of a credible threat judged from the ob-
jective standpoint of a reasonable, similarly-situated government,
coupled with the articulation of specific types of dangers that
track one or more of the three clauses, and not Nicaragua's un-
duly restrictive self-defense argument, that can be a restraint on
"cowboy behavior."
2.3. Preventing Abusive Invocations ofArticle XXI(b)
The two restraints discussed in the previous section, giving
prior notice in the hope of engendering support, or at least mini-
mizing opposition, to national security sanctions, and using the
critical terms in the introductory chapeau to Article XXI(b) as a
gauge of the reasonableness of such sanctions are not fail safe de-
vices against "cowboy behavior." The world community has yet
to produce fail safe devices and until it does so, the risk of a corro-
sive effect on the multilateral trading system from abusive invoca-
tions of Article XXI(b) is real.
One observer suggests the risk for abuses of Article XXI(b)
cannot be hedged, writing that "there may be little that can be
done about" the "dangerous loophole to the obligations of
GATT."34 This statement is unduly pessimistic. To ensure the
34 JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 748
(1969). But see id. at 752 (referring to GATT loopholes found throughout Arti-
cle XXI exceptions).
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proper use of Article XXI(b) the WTO and the United Nations
Security Council may attempt to increase coordination.35 For ex-
ample, a joint WTO-Security Council Committee on National
Security Sanctions could be established to render at least a non-
binding, non-precedential opinion in each case that addresses two
questions: (1) Does the use of such sanctions comport with the
terms of Article XXI(b)?; (2) Are the sanctions reasonable in rela-
tion to the threat or actual danger posed?
Another, more ambitious, step would be to encourage the use
of national security sanctions only after an appropriate Security
Council resolution has been adopted.36 In addition, if the answer
to either of the above two questions is negative, then the joint
Committee could render an advisory opinion on the use of
counter-retaliatory measures by the sanctioned and adversely af-
fected third countries. In sum, it does not seem impossible, and
indeed may be necessary, to develop checks that preserve the sov-
ereign national security prerogative of individual WTO Members,
while simultaneously highlighting threats to the multilateral trad-
ing system posed by abusive assertions of this prerogative.
2.4. The Non-Controversial Parts ofArticle XXI
GATT Article XXI contains three parts that are, or at least
ought not to be, particularly controversial: Article XXI(a),
XXI(b)(i), and XXI(c). Article XXI(a) assures a sanctioning mem-
ber that it has no obligation to furnish information to the WTO
or other Members that "it considers contrary to its essential na-
tional security interests." 37 No sovereign country would be will-
ing, or should be expected, to surrender its ability to keep infor-
mation secret, particularly when such information is of a sensitive
nature and its disclosure might compromise intelligence sources.
3 8
This prerogative does, and must, remain in the discretion of each
country. The use of the word "it" makes it clear that deciding
35 Indeed, Article 86 of the Havana Charter, which was not inco orated
into GATT, attempted to sort out jurisdiction between the InternationT Trade
Organization and the United Nations by granting the latter jurisdiction not
only over political matters, but also over economic measures adopted for politi-
cal reasons. For a discussion of Article 86, see 1 WTO, supra note 10, at 609-10.
36 See id. at 603 (mentioning Security Council Resolution 502). This situa-
tion did in fact occur at the Falkiands crisis.
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what information is inappropriate for disclosure rests with each
individual Member.3 9 In the 1949 Czech case, for instance, U.S.
representative to the GATT invoked Article XXI(a), stating that
"[t]he United States does consider it contrary to its security inter-
est-and to the security interest of other friendly countries-to
reveal the names of the commodities that it considers to be most
strategic."40 At the same time, invoking Article XXI(a) without
disclosing any credible evidence of a national security threat may
be politically unacceptable. 4 ' That is, to preclude the criticism
that a sanctioning member is "crying wolf," there seems to be a de
facto requirement on that Member to present at least a primafacie
case that a real threat exists.
Article XXI(b)(i) concerns national security sanctions neces-
sary to protect against a threat from "fissionable materials" or
their parent materials.42 Notwithstanding the introductory cha-
peau to Article XXI(b), which does raise interpretive issues,4 3 the
particular exception in clause (i) is quite understandable. Under
XXI(b)(i) no sovereign country should have to concern itself with
trade obligations under GATT when it faces a nuclear weapons
threat.44 Clause (i) simply states the obvious: protecting oneself
against a nuclear weapons threat, and more generally, deterring
nuclear weapons proliferation, is more important than adhering
to the GATT.45
Article XXI(c) ensures proper prioritization between the
WTO and the United Nations, particularly the Security Coun-
cil.46 Maintaining international peace and security by performing
obligations under the U.N. Charter is more important than ad-
hering to GATT rules.47 Accordingly, the fact that trade embar-
goes or other sanctions imposed by the Security Council on rogue
countries might violate GATT obligations to those countries is,
and should be, irrelevant.
39 See id.
40 1 WTO, supra note 10, at 602.
41 The United States encountered this problem -with respect to the Iran and
Libya Sanctions Act of 1996. See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
42 See GATT art. XXI(b).
43 See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
44See GATT art. XX(b)(i).
41 See id.
46 See GATT art. XXI(c).
47 See id.
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It is noteworthy that Article XXI(c) does not expressly give
WTO Members the right to determine whether its terms are met
because, in contrast to Article XXI(a) and (b), Article XXI(c) does
not contain the words "which it considers." This omission is
not, however, surprising. In practice, Charter obligations con-
cerning international peace and security will be agreed to by the
Security Council, and the problem of unilateral action is unlikely
to arise in this context. For example, in 1966 the Security Coun-
cil adopted Resolution 232, requiring a trade embargo against
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe),' 9 and the resolution was followed by
most, if not all, GATT Contracting Parties. 
5 0
2.5. Suing a Sanctioning Member
The relationship between GATT Articles XXI and XXII is
not evident from the language of either of these Articles.51 Since
Article XXI does not require notice, approval, or ratification,5 2 it
would seem to follow that it creates no right for a non-
sanctioning member to sue a sanctioning member. On the other
hand, the 1949 Czechoslovak complaint against the United States
regarding American export controls did lead to a decision in favor
of the United States under Article XXIII(2) as to "whether the
Government of the United States had failed to carry out its obli-
gations under the Agreement through its administration of the is-
sue of export licenses."5 3 The Contracting Parties appear to have
thought that mere invocation of Article XXI did not immunize a
sanctioning member from an Article XXIII action. Similarly, in
the discussion of the restrictions imposed on Argentina during the
Falklands crisis, one view expressed was that Argentina "reserved
its rights under Article XXIII in respect of any injury resulting
from trade restrictions applied in the context of Article XXI,"
and, more generally, that "the provisions of Article XXI were
subject to those of Article XXIII(2)."14 Not surprisingly, para-
graph two of the above-quoted November 1982 "Decision Con-
48 Compare id. arts. XXI(a), (b), (c).
49 See Jackson, supra note 27, at 751.
'o See id.
51 See GATT arts. XXI, XXIII.
52 See 1 WTO, supra note 10, at 600.
51 Id. at 606.
' Id. at 606.
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cerning Article XXI of the General Agreement" specifies that
"when action is taken under Article XXI, all contracting parties
affected by such action retain their full rights under the General
Agreement."55
It is safe to conclude that a non-sanctioning member has a
right to bring an Article XXIII action and invoke the Uruguay
Round Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Set-
tlement of Disputes56 against a sanctioning member. This action
could be brought on the ground that a particular national security
sanction nullifies or impairs benefits under the GATT that oth-
erwise would accrue to the non-sanctioning member. The action,
moreover, may be one involving nullification or impairment that
results either because the disputed sanction is an outright viola-
tion of a GATT obligation (i.e., violation nullification or im-
pairment under Article XXIII(1)(a)) or because of the way in
which the sanction is applied (i.e., non-violation nullification or
impairment under Article XXIII(1)(b)). Indeed, in virtually every
case, a non-violation nullification or impairment claim is likely to
be credible because if the disputed sanction is at all effective, the
existence of trade damage would not be in doubt.
The next obvious question is whether the right to bring an
Article XXIII action means anything in practice. In other words,
is a WTO panel or appellate body likely to adjudicate the merits
of a non-sanctioning member's attack on the invocation of Article
XXI? The answer is almost assuredly no. As the textual analysis
of Article XXI(b) above indicates,57 invocation of the national se-
curity exception is a matter left to the discretion of a sanctioning
member. Moreover, realpolitik demands that Members retain this
sovereign prerogative even if additional multilateral checks against
abuse are adopted in the future. National legislators believe that
one of the surest ways to damage the WTO would be for it to at-
tempt to encroach on this prerogative. Accordingly, as a practical
matter, it is likely that a WTO panel, like the GATT panel in the
United States-Nicaragua case, would interpret its terms of refer-
ence narrowly to exclude a ruling on the substantive Article XXI
arguments. Inevitably, this interpretation will leave the com-
plaining non-sanctioning member unhappy, as it did in the Nica-
55 Id. at 606. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
' Id. at 607.
57 See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
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ragua case: Nicaragua blocked adoption of the October 1986 re-
port in part because of its failure to make recommendations.5 8 To
a U.S. litigator, however, this interpretation ought not to be a
surprise: U.S. courts, including and perhaps especially the Su-
preme Court, routinely seek to base a decision on less controver-
sial procedural grounds and thereby avoid harder and more con-
troversial substantive issues. In short, the 1949 Czechoslovakian
decision of the Contracting Parties may prove to be the first and
last major substantive ruling on the invocation of Article XXI
rendered under GATT-WTO adjudication procedures.
3. WHAT THE UNITED STATES DOES: ASSESSING THE IRAN AND
LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT OF 1996
3.1. What Purpose Could New Sanctions Possibly Serve?
National security is the stated purpose of the ILSA.5 9  As
President Clinton summed up when signing the legislation, Iran
and Libya are "two of the most dangerous sponsors of terrorism
in the world."60 Moreover, each country is widely reputed to
seek the acquisition of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.
Sections 2 and 3 of the ILSA amplify the perceived national secu-
rity threats by using aggressive language (again resembling the
Helms-Burton Act), noting Congressional findings, and declaring
policy, with respect to Iran and Libya:
58 See 1 WTO, supra note 10, at 608.
59 See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat.
1541 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. S 1701 note). The Department of State has
published guidelines on the implementation of the "ILSA." See 61 Fed. Reg.
66,067 (1996).
The ILSA is sometimes referred to as the "D'Amato Act," after Senator Al-
phonse D'Amato of New York, who introduced the original bill. Because the
entire ILSA is codified as a note to Section 1701 of Title 50, references below to
rovisions in the ILSA are to the sections in the ILSA as set forth in the note.
he legislative history to the ILSA is contained in two House Reports. See
H.R. REP. No. 104-523(1) (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1296
accompanying the original version of H.R. 3107);H.R. REP. No. 104-523(11)
(1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1311 (accompanying the bill as enacted).
In general, these House Reports offer few insights beyond -vhat is already obvi-
ous from the language of the ILSA.
60 Gary G. Yerkey, President Clinton Signs into Law Legislation to Punish
Foreign Firms Investing in Iran, Libya, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1273 (Aug. 7,
1996) [hereinafter Clinton Signs into Law].
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Sec. 2. Findings
The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The efforts of the Government of Iran to acquire
weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver
them and its support of acts of international terrorism en-
danger the national security and foreign policy interests of
the United States ....
(4) The failure of the Government of Libya to comply
with Resolutions 731 [adopted January 21, 1992, concern-
ing the handover for prosecution of two Libyan nationals
suspected of being responsible for the bombing of Pan Am
103], 748 [adopted March 31, 1992, prohibiting exports
to Libya of goods, services, and technology relating to pe-
troleum resource development or nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons], and 883 [adopted November 11, 1993,
prohibiting exports to Libya of equipment for transport-
ing or refining petroleum] of the Security Council of the
United Nations, its support of international terrorism, and
its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction consti-
tute a threat to international peace and security that en-
dangers the national security and foreign policy interests
of the United States ....
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy.
(a) Policy with Respect to Iran.
The Congress declares that it is the policy of the United
States to deny Iran the ability to support acts of international
terrorism and to fund the development and acquisition of
weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver
them by limiting the development of Iran s ability to explore
for, extract, refine, or transport by pipeline petroleum re-
sources of Iran.
(b) Policy with respect to Libya.
The Congress further declares that it is the policy of the
United States to seek full compliance by Libya with its ob-
ligations under Resolutions 731, 748, and 883 of the Secu-
rity Council of the United Nations, including ending all
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. j. Int'l Econ. L.
support for acts of international terrorism and efforts to de-
velop or acquire weapons of mass destruction.
61
The italicized language bespeaks the theory of the ILSA: a di-
rect connection exists between (1) the threat to the United States'
national security arising from terrorism sponsored by Iran and
Libya and from their efforts to obtain certain weapons and (2)
profits earned by the Iranian and Libyan governments made pos-
sible by foreign investment in the development of the petroleum
resources of these countries. Peter Tarnoff, Secretary of State, tes-
tified with respect to the purpose of the ILSA, "[a] straight line
links Iran's [and, for that matter, Libya's] oil income and its abil-
ity to sponsor terrorism, build weapons of mass destruction, and
acquire sophisticated armaments." 6  In brief, these rogue gov-
ernments use some of the profits from the development of their
petroleum industry to fund terrorists activities and buy materials
for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Hence, the ILSA
aims to constrict Iran and Libya's key funding source and thereby
contain their threatening terrorist activities.
6 3
To facilitate the application and enforcement of sanctions in
support of the United States' national security interests, the ILSA
carefully defines the terms "act of international terrorism,"
"petroleum resources," "develop," and "investment." 64 An "act of
international terrorism" is an act that (1) is "violent or dangerous
to human life," (2) violates federal or state criminal laws (or
would violate these laws if committed within federal or state ju-
risdictions), and (3) "appears to be intended" to "intimidate or co-
erce a civilian population," "influence the policy of a government
by intimidation or coercion," or "affect the conduct of a govern-
ment by assassination or kidnapping."65  "Petroleum resources,"
the heart of the target of the sanctions against Iran and Libya, re-
61 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act S 2-3 (emphasis added).
62 H.R. REP. NO. 104-523() at 9.
63 See id. at 8. On the other hand, some argue that the ILSA should focus
more narrowly on the quest for nuclear weapons capability. Two prominent
former national security advisors, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft,
argue that Iran's nuclear weapons capability, is "[t]he single most worrisome
aspect of Iran's behavior." Zbigniew Brzezinski et al., Differentiated Contain-
ment, 76 FOREIGN AFF., May/June 1997, at 20, 27; see also Edward Mortimer,
The Satanic Dialogue, FIN. TIMES, May 21, 1997, at 28.
64 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act S 14.
6" Id. S 14(1).
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fer to "petroleum and natural gas resources."6 6  The term
"develop" or "development" is used only in the context of petro-
leum resources and refers to exploring, extracting, refining, or
transporting these resources. 67 As discussed in greater detail be-
low, investment" is defined in a manner that focuses on the pe-
troleum industry. An investment includes three specific activities
undertaken pursuant to an agreement entered into after the en-
actment of the legislation between the governments of Iran or
Libya and a non-governmental entity in Iran and Libya. The
three covered activities are: (1) developing Iranian or Libyan pe-
troleum resources or guaranteeing another person's agreement to
develop these resources; (2) acquiring an equity interest (i.e., buy-
ing shares) in the development of Iranian or Libyan petroleum re-
sources; and (3) receiving royalties, earnings, or profits from the
development of Iranian or Libyan petroleum resources.69 The
definition of investment is further qualified so as to exclude the
entry into an agreement to buy or sell goods, services, or technol-
ogy. However, this narrowing of the definition of investment
may be somewhat confusing, because it is unclear how to deal
with an inconsistency between the qualification and one of the
aforementioned three activities. For example, suppose a company
"develops" the Iranian petroleum industry by selling drilling
equipment to the government of Iran. The qualification suggests
the sale of such equipment is not an investment.
It is, therefore, clear that preservation of national security is
the ILSA's stated purpose. What is not so obvious, however, is
why Congress and President Clinton thought it necessary to enact
new sanctions against Iran and Libya. Pursuant to the Interna-
tional Emergency Economic Power Act of 1977 ("IEEPA"),7 l the
United States already has a trade embargo against Iran and Libya.
Why enact another statute? To put the question skeptically,
6 Id. S 14(15).
67 See id. S 14(4).
68 See infra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
69 See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act 5 14(9).
70 See id.
71 International Emergency Economic Power Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91
Stat. 1625 (1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. SS 1701-1706). For a discussion of the
1977 Act and the Iranian and Libyan embargoes, seeHOUSE COMM. ON WAYS
AND MEANS, 105- CONG., OVERVIEW AND COMPILATION OF U.S. TRADE
STATUTES 167-70 (Comm. Print 1997) <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi:-
bin/multidb.cgi>.
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given the existing embargoes, what types of novel sanctions could
possibly exist, and what purposes could any further sanctions pos-
sibly serve?
An answer to both questions is found in the economic distinc-
tion between a primary and secondary boycott. The trade em-
bargoes imposed against Iran and Libya are primary boycotts; that
is, with the use of the primary boycott the United States forbids
U.S. individuals from importing goods or services from, or ex-
porting goods or services to, the target countries. Therefore, the
primary boycott is an act of self-restraint by the boycotting coun-
try (or countries). On the other hand, a secondary boycott in-
volves not only the boycotting and target countries, but also third
countries. The essence of a secondary boycott is the attempt to
limit the extent of economic dealings of third countries with the
target country. The ILSA not only reinforces the United States'
primary boycott, but more importantly, it imposes a secondary
boycott against Iran and Libya. It imposes penalties against non-
U.S., as well as U.S. individuals and businesses that invest in the
Iranian and Libyan petroleum industries. Thus, the ILSA resem-
bles the Helms-Burton Act measures, discussed above, insofar as
the Helms-Burton Act also contains a secondary boycott measure,
namely barring non-U.S., as well as U.S. persons from trafficking
confiscated property, and bars non-U.S. persons engaged in such
trafficking from entry into the United States.
The distinction between a primary and secondary boycott is
evident from a petroleum resource development transaction in-
volving the U.S. oil company Conoco, Inc., the French oil giant
Total S.A., and Iran. In early 1995 it was reported that Conoco,
Inc. initiated a one billion dollar contract with Iran to develop oil
fields around Iran's Sirri Island. In response, President Clinton
invoked the IEEPA to prohibit U.S. persons from financing,
managinh, or supervising the development of Iran's petroleum re-
sources. This response was a primary boycott, and it was suc-
cessful because Conoco, Inc. was forced to withdraw from the
contract. However, to the dismay of Congress and Clinton Ad-
ministration officials, the French oil firm Total S.A. assumed
Conoco's abandoned contract by agreeing to develop the Sirri Is-
land oil fields in a deal worth nearly $600 million.73 In enacting a
72 See Exec. Order No. 12,957, 60 Fed. Reg. 14,615 (1995).
73 See H.R. REP. No. 104-523(1), at 9-11; Gary G. Yerkey, EUFiles Formal
Protest with U.S. over Law Penalizing Foreign Firms with Ties to Iran, Libya, 13
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secondary boycott against Iran and Libya, Congress sought to dis-
courage such opportunistic behavior in disregard of U.S. national
security concerns.
In addition to the primary-secondary boycott distinction,
Congress also passed the ILSA in reaction to two incidents it per-
ceived to have been orchestrated by Iranian or Libyan-backed ter-
rorists. The first incident was the July 1996 explosion of a Trans
World Airlines Boeing 747 jetliner, flying from New York's
Kennedy Airport and bound for Paris killing all 230 passengers
and crew. After the tragedy, the U.S. press speculated that the
explosion was caused by a terrorist bomb. However, to date,
there is no evidence to suggest terrorist involvement; thus, in ret-
rospect, Congress may have over-reacted to the incident. Many
have indicated that the United States overestimates Iran's in-
volvement in terrorism. Indeed, a Financial Times editorial ob-
served that "[a]t the core of the European case is the fact that
[U.S.] assertions about Iran's role in terrorism remain un-
proven."75 The Economist intoned that evidence for the United
States' charge that "Iran is the prime suspect when international
terrorism is directed against American interests" has "yet to be
produced" and that "[w]ithout specific evidence, the Americans
have been making do with vague stuff, leaking 'classified' docu-
ments that reveal a network of training camps around Iran to
prepare terrorists for international operations."76 In brief, al-
though many will admit the Iranian government has terrorist
tendencies, U.S. trading partners do not believe that Iran is the
godfather of international terrorism. To be sure, Article XXI(a)
of GATT does not require a WTO Member to divulge informa-
tion that would compromise its essential national security inter-
ests.77 Nonetheless, as the Financial Times suggests, the United
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1315, 1316 (Aug. 14, 1996) [hereinafter EU Files Formal
Protest].
74 See, e.g., Nancy Dunne & Robert Corzine, Politics Sets Tone for Trade
Barriers, FIN. TIMES, July 25, 1996, at 4 (noting "the widespread suspicion in
the US [sic] that a terrorist bomb, possibly of Iranian or Middle Eastern ori gin"
brought down the TWA jetliner); Laurie Lande, Congress Seeks End to Liya,
Iran Ties by Foreign Firms, WALL ST. J., July 24, 1996, at A16 (observing that
"congressional fears about terrorism . . . only increased" following the TWA
explosion and that "[a]uthorities are investigating whether the crash may have
been caused by terrorists").
75 Handling Iran, FN. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1996, at 17.
76 Is Iran the Godfather?, ECONOMIST, Aug. 17, 1996, at 33.
77 See 1 WTO, supra note 10, at 601-02.
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States must make at least a prima facie case if it expects its Euro-
pean allies to sign onto the secondary boycott.
78
The June 1996 bombing of a Saudi Arabian Apartment build-
ing housing U.S. military personnel is the second incident which
prompted Congress to enact the ILSA.7 9 This bombing killed
nineteen U.S. service personnel, and was widely thought to have
been orchestrated by Iranian terrorists. However, once again, no
credible evidence links Iran nor Libya to the bombing. To the
contrary, the perpetrators may well have been Saudi dissidents.
3.2. Are the New Sanctions Prudent?
Like the Helms-Burton Act, the ILSA is condemned by many
of the United States' closest military allies and most significant
trading partners simply because it is a unilateral effort at a secon-
dary boycott. In the eyes of U.S. military allies and trading
partners, this type of boycott gives the sanctions an unwarranted,
perhaps illegal, and extraterritorial effect. In effect, critics of the
ILSA see it as an attempt by the United States to bully other na-
tions into complying with a unilaterally-imposed sanction regime.
Furthermore, the United States' secondary boycott is viewed,
quite rightly, as hypocritical. The United States balked at the at-
tempt by Arab countries to enforce a secondary boycott against
Israel; in fact, the United States enacted blocking legislation mak-
ing it illegal to comply with the boycott.8" Now, however, the
United States expects compliance with its secondary boycott of
Iran and Libya. Finally, critics point out that the secondary boy-
cott is a target around which Iranian nationalists and Colonel
Muammar Gadaffi can rally their people against the United States,
as Castro has attempted to do with respect to the Helms-Burton
Act. 2 Thus, ironically, the boycott may reinforce the behavior
78 See Handling Iran, supra note 75.
79 See Bruce Clark, U.S Split on How to Handle Iran, FIN. TIMEs, Apr. 17,
1997, at 5; Jane M. Freeberg, US Penalizes Investors in Iran and Libya, INT'L
FIN. L. REv., Oct. 1996, at 23.
80 See, e.g., Canada Criticizes U.S. Iran-Libya Law as Unsupportable Extrater-
ritoriality, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1316 (Aug. 14, 1996); EU Files Formal
Protest, supra note 73, at 1315.
81 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
82 See, e.g., Roula Khalaf, US Sanctions Are Gadaffit's Greatest Fear, FIN.
TIMES, Oct. 30, 1996, at 4 (noting that the sanctions are"a convenient tool" for
Gadaffi and "have the perverse effect of bolstering the Libyan leader and rein-
forcing a deep resentment of the US").
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of the Iranian and Libyan governments that the United States
seeks to alter through the ILSA.
These criticisms raise the practical problem of the efficacy of
the ILSA: can the statute achieve its stated purpose of safeguard-
ing national security given the intense opposition from U.S. allies
and trading parties? Two Congresspersons, who voted in favor of
the ILSA, summarize the argument that a unilaterally-imposed
secondary boycott cannot work:
[W]e are concerned that the bill [H.R. 3107, the initial ver-
sion of the ILSA] could be counterproductive to the goal
of increasing multilateral economic and political pressure
on Iran [and Libya]....
Our concern here is not that we may offend our allies,
for we object to their unwillingness to adopt tougher
measures to isolate Iran [and Libya] economically and po-
litically. Our concern is more practical: The United
States cannot adequately pressure Iran's [or Libya's] econ-
omy alone. A strong adverse reaction by other govern-
ments to a U.S. effort to penalize their firms will put us at
odds with some of our closest friends. That could ulti-
mately reduce, rather than increase, multilateral coopera-
tion on Iran [and Libya].
We believe recent history is instructive. Western efforts
to confront another dangerous country-the former Soviet
Union-were set back in 1982 when the United States
tried to sanction firms participating in the development of
a Soviet gas pipeline.
The target of U.S. pressure in 1982 was subsidiaries of
U.S. firms, yet the reaction in Europe was intense. And
U.S. sanctions did not achieve their goal: the sanctions
were not sustainable, and the United States ultimately had
to lift them. The bill before us today would hit foreign
firms. We can expect at least as strong a response.
83
83 ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF THE HONORABLE LEE H. HAMILTON AND THE
HONORABLE JAMES P. MORAN, in H.R. REP. No. 104-523(1), at 20-21 (1996),
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1296, 1309; see also Toby Roth, New Iranian-
Libyan Sanctions Will Only Hurt U.S., WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 1996, at A14
(arguing the ILSA will isolate the United States from other governments whose
help the United States needs to contain threats from Iran and Libya).
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Some of the critics, particularly those in Europe, are moti-
vated by economic self-interest. As a European Commission
spokesperson admitted, "Europe is energy dependent on these na-
tions [Iran and Libya]" and "can't afford to seriously hurt our
economies because of a [sanctions] strategy that hasn't proven to
be effective." 84 More than twenty percent of the European Un-
ion's oil and gas supplies come from Iran and Libya." Iran, in
particular, is the world's third largest oil exporter. ° ° Business ties
between Iran and Germany are close, and Iran's leading trading
partner is Germany. About 170 German companies (including
Siemens AG and Mannesmann AG) do business in Iran, and Ira-
nian goverAmental and private entities owe approximately $8.8
billion to German businesses.
87
Despite these economic facts about Iran, the ILSA might have
engendered less opposition in Europe if it had not included Libya.
The extent of ties, especially in the petroleum resource industry,
between Europe and Libya is greater than between Europe and
Iran. Only one European oil company, Total, has significant di-
rect investments in Iran's petroleum resource industry.88 Moreo-
ver, as of this writing, only one European oil company, Total, has
challenged the ILSA. 9 In September 1997, Total and its two con-
sortium partners, Malaysia's Petronas and Russia's Gazprom
signed a contract with Iran's National Iranian Oil Company.
The contract calls for the consortium to invest two billion dollars
to develop part of the South Pars natural gas field, which is near
Iran's maritime border with Oatar.' Production of the gas field
is scheduled to start in 2001. The Clinton Administration has
84 Lande, supra note 74, at A16 (discussing a bill that sought to curb in-
vestment in Iran and Libya).
85 See Clinton Signs into Law, supra note 60, at 1274.
86 See Bruce Clark, US Applauds European Stand on Iran, FIN. TIMES, Apr.
12-13, 1997, at 3.
87 See Greg Steinmetz, EU Unlikely to Impose Embargo on Iran, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 14, 1997, at A12; Trading with Terrorists, WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1996, at
A12.
88 See Clark, supra note 86.
89 See David Owen & Guy de Jonquieres, Total to Defy US with $2bn Iran
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threatened to impose sanctions on Total under the ILSA, and
such sanctions remain a "real, live option."93 However, France
has threatened serious actions if sanctions are imposed as a result
of the contract, and the EU has said it will resurrect its complaint
in the WTO regarding the Helms-Burton Act if sanctions are im-
posed.94 If France takes a tougher stance against Iran with respect
to terrorism and chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, the
Clinton Administration may waive sanctions. 95  Given Iran has
fifteen percent of the world's proven natural gas reserves, which
are second only to Russia's reserves, the Total contract should not
have come as a surprise to the Administration. 6 Moreover, Total
is one of many foreign companies that are anxious to develop
Iran's reserves. As the Financial Times pointed out, "Total is
[fast] developing a reputation for targeting output from 'outlaw'
countries such as Iran, Iraq, Libya and Burma - although [Total]
chairman Thierry Desmarest has claimed it is just that 'the Lord
put the reserves in places that are a bit hot on political
grounds."' 98
In contrast to the more modest dealings in Iran and aside from
the September 1997 Total contract, several European companies,
such as Agip of Italy, Repsol of Spain, OMV of Austria, and Pet-
rofina of Belgium, have had dealt in Libya's industry. Addition-
ally, several other European companies, such as Lasmo of the
U.K., have explored Libya's potential reserves.99 For Italy, which
buys thirty percent of its oil from Libya, participating in a secon-
dary boycott of Libya's petroleum resource industry would be
93 Sanctions Against French Firm over Iran Deal Called Live Option' by U.S.
Official, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 64 (an. 14, 1998), quoting Stuart E. Eizen-
stat, Undersecretary of State for Economics, Business, and Agricultural Affairs.
94 See Gerard Baker et al., US Condemns Total's $2bn Iran DealFIN. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 1997, at 1; Guy de Jonqui~res et al.,Avoiding Total War, FIN. TIMES,
Oct. 3, 1997, at 8; Guy de Jonquieres, Transatlantic Trade Peace at Risk, FIN.
TIMES, Sept. 30, 1997, at 7.
9s Hardliners in Congress, most notably Senator Alfonse M. D'Amato (R-
N.Y.), argue a waiver is permissible only if the European Union, or at least
France, imposes its own sanctions regime against Iran. See Gary G. Yerkey,
Gazprom Withdraws from Agreement with Ex-Im Bank Following Hill Criticism,
14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2241 (Dec. 24, 1997).
96 See Virginia Marsh, Other Investors Watch and Wait, FIN. TIMEs, Sept.
30, 1997, at 7.
97 See id.
98 Owen & de Jonquieres, supra note 89, at 20.
9 See Dunne & Corzine, supra note 74, at 4.
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impossible regardless of the length of the boycott. Thus, not-
withstanding the Total contract, the ILSA might have been better
received in Europe if it had left out Libya.
Leaving Libya out of the ILSA also might have been in the
long-term strategic interest of the United States. At present, the
principal access for the United States to Caspian Sea oil is through
Russia. 00 However, Russia has yet to demonstrate it will obtain
stablitiy in the democratic, market economy. Non-Russian access
to Caspian Sea oil could be provided through Iran. Furthermore,
if Saudi Arabia were to be overtaken by Islamic extremists, the
importance of such access would increase.
In fairness to supporters of the new sanctions against Iran and
Libya, it must be acknowledged that the ILSA is not uniformly
unilateral in nature. Rather, the ILSA "urges" the President to
undertake diplomatic efforts, in international forums such as the
United Nations and bilaterally with U.S. allies, and "to establish a
multilateral sanctions regime against Iran" to limit the develop-
ment of its petroleum resources and thereby inhibit its efforts to
sponsor acts of international terrorism.10 1 Curiously, there is no
comparable provision in the ILSA regarding Libya. The Presi-
dent must report periodically to Congress the results of these dip-
lomatic efforts and, in particular, must list the countries that have
and have not agreed to sanctions measures which would further
the objective of denying Iran the ability to support acts of interna-
tional terrorism by limiting the development of its petroleum in-
dustry.
10 2
There is a possible link between diplomatic efforts at establish-
ing a multilateral sanctions regime against Iran, on the one hand,
and the unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States, on the
other. As discussed below, the President may waive the invest-
100 See Robert D. Kaplan, My the U.S. and Iran Will Be Friends Again,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 1997, at A18.
101 See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, S 4(a),
110 Stat. 1541 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. S 1701 note).
102 See id. $ 4(b); see also S 4(e) (requiring the President to report to Con-
gress 90 days after August 5, 1996 on whether and the extent to which the EU,
Korea, Australia, Israel, and Japan have imposed sanctions on Iran and Libya,
and the disposition of any GATT or WTO panel decision on such sanctions)
§ 10 (requiring the President to report to Congress, inter alia, on his efforts to
persuade other countries to pressure Iran to (1) cease its support for interna-
tional terrorism and its attempts to acquire nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons and (2) withdraw diplomats who participated in the 1979 takeover of
the U.S. embassy in Tehran).
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ment-triggered sanction against Iran if a country "has agreed to
undertake substantial measures, including economic sanctions"
that will inhibit Iran's efforts to support international terror-
ism.1 3 Neither the ILSA nor the legislative history thereto ex-
plains what might constitute "substantial measures"; rather, it is a
matter requiring Presidential discretion. Nonetheless, it is con-
ceivable that substantial measures would include participation in a
multilateral sanctions regime arranged as a result of the Presi-
dent's diplomatic efforts. If so, then the nationals (i.e., the indi-
viduals and businesses from that country) participating in the re-
gime would be eligible for a sanctions waiver. It would, after all,
be unreasonable to target individuals and businesses participating
in the sanctions in the secondary boycott pursuant to the ILSA
when their country is participating in multilateral sanctions
against Iran. Conversely, the enhanced sanction, discussed below,
must be imposed on nationals of a country that does not qualify
for a sanctions waiver. Thus, failure of a country to participate in
a multilateral sanctions regime against Iran, assuming this failure
is a failure "to undertake substantial measures," could well mean
the nationals of that country will not receive a sanctions waiver.
Instead, they would be subject to the enhanced sanction.
Additionally, in fairness to thesupporters of new sanctions
against Iran and Libya, European governments failure to react
strongly to terrorism is sometimes disconcerting. In 1992, four
Kurdish opposition leaders were killed in a Berlin restaurant.
104
In April 1997, a Berlin court convicted four perpetrators for the
1992 assassinations.105 In the verdict, Judge Frithjof Kubsch de-
clared that "[t]he Iranian political leadership is responsible," 106 and
specifically identified Mr. Ali Fallahian, Iran's chief of foreign in-
103 Id. S 4(c)(1) (emphasis added). The President must notify Congress of
the waiver at least 30 days before the waiver takes effect. See id. S 4(c)(2).
104 For media accounts of the case and its aftermath, see EU Ignores U.S.
Request to Take Economic Measures Against Iran, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 787
(Apr. 30, 1997); EU Suspends "Critical Dialogue' with Iran; Ending Ties Is
Weighed, Dutch Official Says, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 706 (Apr. 16, 1997);
Steinmetz, supra note 84; Frederick Stiidemann & Lionel Barber, Death Case
Ruling Leads to Tougher EU Stance over Iran, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1997, at 22;
Frederick Stiidemann, New Turn in German Ties with Iran, FIN. TIMEs, Apr.
11, 1997, at 5.
10s See Greg Steinmetz, Ruling on Killing Spurs EU to Curb Links with Iran,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 1997, at All.
106 Id.
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telligence, as having orchestrated the murders. 10 7 Following this
verdict, the European Union ("EU")suspended its policy of
"critical dialog" with Iran, and all EU members, except Greece,
recalled their ambassadors from Tehran. However, no European
country enacted trade sanctions.
1 0 8
3.3. What Are the New Sanctions?
Given the purpose of attacking terrorist activities by limiting
the petroleum resource development profits used to fund such ac-
tivities, the sanction mechanism in the ILSA is predictable. The
ILSA seeks to bar new investments above a certain threshold or
"trigger"'0 9 in the Iranian and Libyan petroleum industries. As-
suming a person violates the ILSA, thereby triggering sanctions,
exactly what sanctions may be imposed? The ILSA lays out six
specific sanction measures. The President is required to impose
two or more of these sanctions on a person that violates the ILSA,
referred to in the ILSA as a "sanctioned person."
110
First, the President may direct the U.S. Export-Import Bank
not to give approval to the issuance of any guarantee, extension of
credit, or insurance in connection with the export of goods or
services to a sanctioned person. 111 Second, the President may de-
cline to issue to a sanctioned person a specific license to allow the
export of sensitive goods or technology, whose export otherwise
would require a license. 112 Third, the President may prohibit any
107 See Robin Allen, Khatami Set to Take Reins in Iran, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 2-
3, 1997, at 2; Philip Golup, Berlin Court Ruling Puts EUs 'Critical Dialogue'
with Iran at Risk, ASIA TIMES, Apr. 14, 1997, at 9; Kurdish Opposition Radio
Welcomes German Arrest Warrant for Minister, BRITISH BROADCASTING
CORPORATION SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Mar. 20, 1996, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File. Amazingly, Mr. Fallahian visited Bonn
in October 1993 at the official invitation of Mr. Bernd Schmidbauer, the secu-
rity advisor to Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and even toured the Munich offices of
Germany's intelligence services. Later, on April 18, 1996, he was indicted by
German prosecutors for having masterminded the murders. He has yet to
stand trial on the charge. See id.
108 For an excellent discussion of the strains in the U.S.-German relation-
ship over Iran, see Charles Lane, Germany's New Ostpolitik, 74 FOREIGN AFF.,
Nov./Dec. 1995, at 77.
109 For a discussion of "triggers" see infra notes 130-73 and accompanying
text.
110 See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, S 5(c),
110 Stat. 1541, 1544 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. S 1701 note).
"' See id. S 6(1).
112 See id. S 6(2).
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U.S. financial institution, such as a commercial or investment
bank, or insurance company," 3 from lending or providing credits
to a sanctioned person in excess of ten million dollars in a twelve-
month period, unless the fundin 4is to support humanitarian ac-
tivities by the sanctioned person.
The fourth type of sanction is imposed only if the sanctioned
person is a financial institution. The sanctioned financial institu-
tion may be denied the ability to serve as a repository of U.S.
government funds.115 In other words, it would not be able to
maintain Treasury Tax and Loan ("TT&L") accounts, where tax
revenues are deposited and maintained on behalf of the U.S. gov-
ernment. In addition, under this sanction the Federal Reserve
may deny the sanctioned financial institution the ability to serve
as a primary dealer in U.S. government debt instruments. The
sanctioned financial institution may not participate directly in
open market operations held through the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York in Treasury bills, notes, and bonds, but rather must
buy these instruments from a primary dealer." 6 A curious point
about this fourth sanction is the relationship between the Presi-
dent and the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve is an inde-
pendent agency of the U.S. government and, in general, does not
take orders from the executive branch. Yet, Congress presumably
intended the possibility that the President order the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York to deny designation to, or revoke the prior
designation of, a financial institution as a primary dealer. Surely,
Congress would not have wanted to see the Federal Reserve
thwart a sanction the President thought appropriate in the inter-
ests of national security.
The fifth sanction is applicable only to persons who currently
are, or who are seeking to become, a U.S. government contractor.
Under this sanction, the President may bar the government from
procuring goods or services from the sanctioned person." 7 If the
113 See id. S 14(5) (defining 'financial institution").
114 See id. S 6(3).
15 See id. S 6(4)(B).
116 See id. 6(4)(A). If a financial institution loses its authority to hold
TT&L accounts, and its primary dealer status, then for purposes of the Presi-
dent imposing two or more of the six sanctions, the financial institution has re-
ceived two (not one) of the sanctions.
117 See id. S 6(5).
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President chooses to impose this sanction, then the ILSA requires
the President to abide by the Uruguay Round Agreement on
Government Procurement, which, in practice, means that he will
eschew imposition of sanctions on "eligible products" that are de-
fined in U.S.law pursuant to the Agreement."' The President
may also restrict imports from the sanctioned person into the
United States. In doing so, the President must act in accordance
with the powers set forth in the International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act, discussed above." 9
The fifth and sixth sanctions provided for in the ILSA are po-
tentially draconian to many companies. Rendering a company
ineligible for U.S. government procurement contracts, 0 or bar-
ring it from exporting to the U.S. market could do irreparable
harm to the company.12 Depending on the facts of each case,
each of the six sanctions is unequally fearsome. For example, a
company might not be a U.S. government contractor, so barring
U.S. government entities from purchasing goods or services from
the company may be ineffectual. Furthermore, a sanctioned
company might rely on Japanese or European banks for most of
its funding. Thus, barring U.S. banks from extending credit to the
company would have little effect on its activities developing Iran's
or Libya's petroleum resources. Even a company that gets most
of its funding from U.S. banks may be able to substitute lenders
and rely on Japanese or European financing. If a company is able
to make this substitution with little or no increase in the sanc-
tioned company's cost of funds, then the sanction actually hurts
the former U.S. bank lenders who involuntarily surrendered the
company's business.
Does the differential impact that particular sanctions might
have suggest a "disconnect" in the ILSA between (1) the aggressive
rhetoric surrounding the purpose of ILSA and (2) the strength of
the measures used to combat terrorism and its supporters? Given
the strong rhetoric, it is difficult to imagine that Congress in-
tended to implement weak set sanctions. To the contrary, it must
be inferred that Congress provided the President with discretion
... See 19 U.S.C. S 2518(4) (1997) (listing the eligible products pursuant to
the Agreement); H.R. REP. No. 104-523(1) (1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1311, 1316.
119 See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act S 6(6).
120 See id.
1 See id. S 6(5).
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to choose two or more sanctions so that the President could ex-
ploit or refrain from exploiting the vulnerabilities unique to a
sanctioned person. For example, a sanctioned financial institution
that is a primary dealer in U.S. government securities might be se-
riously damaged if the Federal Reserve were to revoke its primary
dealer status because buying Treasury securities at New York fed-
eral auctions and re-selling them to the investment community
may be a highly profitable business. In other cases, a sanctioned
company may rely on a license from the U.S. government to ex-
port sensitive high-technology equipment to China. Failure to
receive the requisite export clearance could mean that the com-
pany goes bankrupt if it cannot obtain the equipment from a non-
U.S. source. Accordingly, the President could use this sanction
against this person by ordering the federal government to revoke
its license and thus disrupt its lucrative status. In sum, it seems
implicit in the ILSA that Congress expects the President to inves-
tigate thoroughly the business situation in which sanctioned per-
sons find themselves, and then choose the most appropriate array
of sanctions.
Because of the potentially serious damage that imposed sanc-
tions may have on a company, practitioners should be aware of
the availability of official guidance upon which there clients can
rely. The ILSA invites companies to seek an advisory opinion
from the Secretary of State as to whether a proposed transaction
would run afoul to the ILSA and thereby subject-the transactor to
liability. A company that relies "in good faith" on an advisory
opinion from the Secretary of State which characterizes the pro-
posed transaction as lawful is free to engage in the transaction and
is thereby immune from sanctions.122  Of course, the company
should be careful not to deviate in practice from the terms of the
transaction that it presented to the Secretary of State and upon
which the advisory opinion rests, unless the opinion calls for a
modification of the deal to qualify for immunity.
122 See id. S 7. With respect to investments in Iran, seeking advice is par-
ticularly important. Even though Section 5(e) of the ILSA requires the Presi-
dent to pub ish in the Federal Register a list of all significant publicly tendered
Iranian oil and gas projects, "the fact that a project does not appear on the list
does not indicate that the project is immune from or, ... any less vulnerable to,
sanction .... " H.R. REP. No. 104-523(11), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1296, 1317.
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3.4. How Far Do the New Sanctions Reach?
The secondary boycott imposed by the ILSA against Iran ap-
plies to "any person"123 the President determines has carried out
one of the prohibited activities discussed below.' 24 The word
"any" is particularly noteworthy because it implicates non-U.S.
persons, thus, rendering extraterritorial the potential scope of the
secondary boycott sanctions under the "ILSA." The extraterrito-
rial scope of the sanctions is expansive since (1) sanctions may be
imposed on a parent or subsidiary of a person, if the parent or
subsidiary enfages in a prohibited transaction with "actual
knowledge;"' 2 and (2) sanctions may be imposed on an affiliate of
a person that is "controlled in fact" by that person and "engage[s]
in " 126 a prohibited activity with "actual knowledge." 127  There-
fore, the ILSA is an excellent example, along with the Helms-
Burton Act, of the long reach of the United States' extraterritorial
jurisdiction with respect to unilateral trade actions.
In order to underscore why this long reach is dramatic and
controversial, consider the following example. Assume a French
corporation, which has a Dutch subsidiary, is owned by a holding
company incorporated in Bermuda. The holding company,
which is a shell and is controlled by senior managers of the
French corporation, also owns a company incorporated in Indo-
nesia. The Indonesian company, in turn, owns a company incor-
porated in Singapore. Like the Bermuda holding company, the
Indonesian and Singaporean companies are controlled in fact by
the French corporation. No U.S. citizens work for any of the
companies.
123 "Any person" includes any individual, corporation, partnership, or
other business entity, or a successor entity. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act
§14(14).
'24 See id. S 5(c) (1).
123 See id. S 5(c)(2)(B).
126 The Department of State guidelines on the implementation of the ILSA
clarify that for corporate parents, "engages in" refers to the facilitation and
authorization of entry into a prohibite[ contract. For subsidiaries,"engages in"
refers to actual participation in the implementation of the contract. See Public
Notice, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,067 (1996).
127 See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act S 5(c)(2)(C).
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Accordingly, the organizational structure is as follows:
Bermuda Holding Company
(Parent of French Subsidiary)
French Subsidiary Indonesian Subsidiary
(Mastermind of Prohibited Activity) (Affiliate of French Subsidiary)
Dutch Corporation Singaporean Corporation
(Subsidiary of French Subsidiary) (Affiliate of French Subsidiary)
Assume the French company engages in a prohibited activity
and is therefore sanctioned under the ILSA. Assume further that
all of the other entities participate in the prohibited activity,
though some in minor respects, with actual knowledge that the
activity is in fact prohibited. Because they are affiliates of and
controlled by the French corporation, the Indonesian and Singa-
porean companies also will be sanctioned. As the parent of the
French corporation, the Bermuda holding company will be sanc-
tioned as well. As the subsidiary of the French corporation, the
Dutch corporation will be sanctioned. The names of all of these
sanctioned entities will be published in the Federal Register.128
The only caveat to sanctioning the parent and subsidiary is the
mens rea requirement of "actual knowledge," and the only caveat
to sanctioning the other affiliates is the mens rea requirement plus
the control-in-fact requirement. In many cases arising under the
ILSA, it will be difficult for U.S. authorities to satisfy these re-
quirements. Moreover, it is not clear whether a parent, subsidi-
ary, or affiliate can have actual knowledge imputed to it if its dif-
ferent officials knew "a piece of the puzzle," but no one official
had a "bird's eye" view of the entire operation. Nor is it clear
whether a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate can be said to have actual
knowledge if it is willfully blind to engagement in the prohibited
128 See id. s 5(d).
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activity. 129 Despite these uncertainties, the possibility of sanctions
is real. Hence, it is quite appropriate for foreign corporations and
their governments to express concern over the long arm of the
ILSA.
3.5. Assessing the Investment Trigger Against Iran
What kind of transaction with respect to Iran will trigger
United States imposition of two or more of the aforementioned
sanctions? The ILSA spells out one prohibited direct foreign in-
vestment transaction. The following direct foreign investment
transaction is prohibited under the ILSA: (1) making an invest-
ment worth forty million dollars or more; (2) on or after August
5, 1996 (the date of enactment of the ILSA); (3) with actual
knowledge; and (4) where the investment "directly and signifi-
cantly" contributes to the enhancement of Iran's ability to de-
velop its petroleum resources.130  Engaging in the above-
mentioned activity triggers sanctions that, absent a waiver, must
be imposed.
Examples of direct foreign investment transactions that would
likely violate the ILSA follow from the definition of
"investment." 131 Three categories of illegal transactions are in-
cluded in this definition of investment. The first category covers
entry into a contract to take responsibility for developing Iranian
petroleum resources or a contract to guarantee another company's
agreement to develop these resources. 132 Contracting to build an
oil rig or pipelifie or providing engineering consulting services
would surely fall within this category.
The second category concerns acquisition of an equity interest
(i.e., buyin shares) in a company that develops Iranian petroleum
resources. I Accordingly, an oil company would violate the
ILSA by purchasing shares in another company that, in turn, de-
velops Iranian petroleum resources. An example of this kind of
violation is the agreement reported in the fall of 1996 that Petro-
nas, Malaysia's state oil company, would acquire a thirty percent
129 There is substantial case law on money laundering regarding both of
these uncertainties. U.S. authorities or corporate counsel might seek to analo-
gize to this law.
130 See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act S 5(a).
131 See id. 5 14(9).
3 See id. S 14(9)(A).
1 See id. S 14(9) (B).
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stake in a $600 million project to develop the Sirri A and E oil
fields in the Persian Gulf off Iran.134  However, as of yet, the
United States has not imposed sanctions in this case.
Legislative history regarding the second category indicates that
portfolio investments are not covered by the sanction mecha-
nism. 3 5 Thus, for example, absent some other applicable prohibi-
tion, nothing in the ILSA bars a mutual fund from investing in
the equity or debt securities of an oil company that itself is in-
volved in the development of Iranian petroleum resources and,
indeed, runs afoul of the ILSA. What is not clear, however, is the
test for distinguishing a direct investment from a portfolio in-
vestment. Does the distinction depend on the nature of the inves-
tor (e.g., an oil company versus a mutual fund), the extent of con-
trol the investor has over the company responsible for developing
petroleum resources (e.g., controlling influence over management
decisions and the right to appoint members of the board of direc-
tors), or the size of the investment (e.g., minority versus majority
stake)? As indicated earlier, the safest strategy for dealing with
these questions is to seek an advisory opinion from the Secretary
of State.
36
The third class of illegal direct foreign investment transactions
deals with the receipt of royalties, earnings, or profits from the
development of Iranian petroleum resources.137 Like the previous
category, the precise boundaries of this category are uncertain.
Typically, earnings and profits would be received as a result of an
equity interest in a petroleum resource development project. Will
this interest be characterized as a portfolio investment? Royalty
payments are likely to be made as a result of the sale or license of
patented technology to a company responsible for a project. Pre-
sumably, a patent holder must take care not to sell or license
technology to a company for use in the Iranian petroleum re-
source sector.
134 See U.S. Embassy Denies Sanctions Are Planned Against Malaysian Oil
Firm For Iranian Dealings, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1698 (Nov. 6, 1996);
James Kynge, Malaysia Angered by U.S. Sanctions Threat, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 1,
1996, at 6.
131 See H.R. RFEP. No. 104-523(1]) (1996), rqrinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1311, 1318 (stating that "the [House Ways and Means] Committee does not in-
tend that the sanctions provided... would extend to portfolio investments
made by any other person in a sanctioned person").
136 See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act S 7.
137 See id. S 14(9) (C).
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Congress anticipated the possibility that businesses might seek
to circumvent the forty million dollars investment trigger sanc-
tion by structuring a transaction in amounts less than forty mil-
lion dollars. Accordingly, the prohibited activity also includes
any combination of investments of at least ten million dollars
each which, in a twelve-month period, add up to or exceed forty
million dollars. 138  Congress also anticipated the possibility that
the investment trigger sanction might not induce other countries
to develop their own sanctions against Iran. Therefore, it in-
cluded a "stick," namely, the possibility of an enhanced sanc-
tion. 139 If a country "has agreed to undertake substantial meas-
ures, including economic sanctions, that will inhibit Iran's efforts"
to support acts of international terrorism, then the President may
waive application of the investment trigger sanction to individuals
and businesses from that country.' 40  However, if a country has
not undertaken "substantial measures" in this regard, then a man-
datory "enhanced" sanction will be applied to individuals and
businesses from that country. The enhancement consists of low-
ering the threshold that triggers the sanction. Instead of a forty
million dollar aggregate limit on petroleum resource investments,
the limit drops to twenty million dollars.' 41 Likewise, the ten
million dollar limit applicable to combinations of investments
drops to five million dollars.' 42 Hence, it becomes illegal to make
a combination of investments of at least five million dollars each
that, in a twelve-month period, equal or exceed twenty million
dollars.
143
The existence of reasonably specific definitions of the terms
"investment,"'4 "develop,"'45 and 'petroleum resources,"146 and
the fact that Congress anticipated certain problems that might
arise, should not suggest that enforcement of the ILSA is me-
138 See id. S 5(a).
13 See id. S4(d). The President is required to report to Congress any coun-
try to which the enhanced sanction is applied. See id.S 4(d)(2).
140 Id. S 4(c)(1). The President must notify Congress of the waiver at least
30 days before the waiver takes effect. See id. S 4(c)(2).
141 See id. SS 4(d)(1), 5(a).
142 See id.
143 See id.
1" Id. S 14(9).
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chanical and without problems. To the contrary, there are several
unresolved issues.147 For example, the ILSA does not provide any
guidance as to what a "direct and significant" contribution to the
development of Iran's petroleum resources would be. Therefore,
it would be an overstatement to say the President lacks discretion
in imposing the mandatory investment trigger sanctions. In fact,
the President must render a case-by-case judgment as to each sus-
pect investment to determine whether it is both "direct" and
"significant" in nature. It is inconceivable that political considera-
tions will not play a role in some of the case determinations. For
example, in July 1997 the Clinton Administration announced it
had no objections under the ILSA to the construction of a $1.6
billion natural gas pipeline linking Turkmenistan and Turkey via
Iran. 14' The pipeline, said Secretary of State Madeleine Albright,
was "a way to help Turkey and Turkmenistan."' 49 Turkey, of
course, is an important ally of the United States, and with respect
to Turkmenistan, the United States has been "keen to wean the
former Soviet Republics away from their economic dependence
on Russia."150 As a legal matter, the decision may be defended on
the ground that the pipeline will not help develop Iranian petro-
leum resources because it will carry Turkmen, not Iranian, natu-
ral gas.1
5 1
As another example, suppose a country bordering Iran builds
a natural gas pipeline on its border with Iran, and buys natural gas
from Iran that will be transported in the new pipeline. Does the
transaction trigger the investment sanction? The issue is not hy-
pothetical, because Turkey is engaging in exactly this sort of
transaction. 52 In August 1996, just days after the ILSA took ef-
147 An examination of the ILSA indicates that several terms used through-
out the Statute are undefined. See id. S 14.
148 See Charles Clover, Azerbaijan Looks to U.S. to End Sanctions, FIN.
TIMES, July 28, 1997, at 4; Robert Corzine, U.S. Decision Sparks a New Round of
Pipeline Politics, FIN. TIMEs, July 31, 1997, at 4.
149 Corzine, supra note 148.
150 Id.
151 See It Will Burn Nicely, Anyway, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 2, 1997, at 30.
Moreover, the United States appears to have taken the position that the deal is
exempt from ILSA because it predates the entry into force of the sanctions. See
Robin Allen, Iran Sidesteps the U.S. to Cultivate Its Neighbours, FIN. TIMES, Dec.
31, 1997, at 3.
152 See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. Continues To Study Iran-Turkey Energy Pact To
Determine Whether It Violates U.S. Trade Law, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1353
(Aug. 21, 1996); Steven Erlanger, Turkey-Iran Gas Deal A Test of U.S. Law On
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fect, a newly elected Islamic government in Turkey signed a
twenty-three year, twenty-three billion dollar natural gas contract
with Iran. l5 3 Under the contract, Iran agreed to sell roughly 140
billion cubic feet of natural gas a year to Turkey beginning in
1998.154 The gas is to be delivered in a new pipeline consisting of
two parts.155 A 680-mile portion of the pipeline will run from the
Turkish-Iranian border into Turkey and will cost $1.2 billion.
5 6
A 170-mile portion of the qipeline will run from the border into
Iran and cost $300 million. 5 Turkey is responsible for building
its portion of the pipeline, while Iran is responsible for building
the portion in Iranian territory. The Turkish government asserts
it is not providing any assistance to the Iranians to build the pipe-
line; however, there have been rumors that through Turkish-
Iranian counter trade transactions the Turks may be providing
some infrastructure assistance. The United States has warned
Turkey that the transaction could violate the ILSA, but Turkey
has claimed that the contract is nothing more than a trade deal, an
exchange of natural gas for money, and trade deals are not prohib-
ited by the ILSA. Nothing in the contract calls for an investment
by Turkey in Iran's petroleum resource development. Turkey
also has political factors in its favor that may save it from sanc-
tions under the ILSA. The United States values Turkey's partici-
pation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") and
the continuation of U.S. military bases in Turkey. Not only did
these bases play an important role in the 1991 Gulf War, but also
they are used to enforce the "no-fly" zones over Iraq. Further-
more, the United States is wary of provoking anti-American Is-
lamic extremists in Turkey. Thus, it seems quite unlikely that the
United States will interpret the Iran investment trigger language
in the ILSA in such a way as to reach Turkey's contract.
Terror?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1996, at A7; Turkey Sets Iran Gas Deal, Says It
Doesn't Defy Ban, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 1996, at A7.
153 See Erlanger, supra note 152.
154 There are discrepancies in media accounts of the exact amount of natu-
ral gas Turkey will purchase each year. Two reports, for example, state that
Iran will supply 105 billion cubic feet beginnin in 1999, and the volume will
rise to 350 bil'on cubic feet by 2005. See Freeberg, supra note 79, at 25; Er-
langer, supra note 152.
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How the United States treats the transaction between Turkey
and Iran may not matter in the end because the Turkey-Iran pipe-
line may be difficult to complete. The proposed pipeline route is
through difficult terrain and hostile Kurdish territory.15 8 Moreo-
ver, Turkey has other sources of natural gas supply, including
Russia, Algeria, Qatar, and possibly Egypt, if a so-called "peace
pipeline" from Egypt through Israel, Lebanon, and Syria is built.
Nonetheless, the United States will surely be confronted with
several other transactions that fall into the "gray" area between
investment and trade. For instance, there are likely to be natural
gas supply deals between Iran and India, Iran and Pakistan, and
Iran and Turkmenistan. 5 9 After all, Iran has the second largest
natural gas resources after Russia, and it is eager to develop these
resources for export purposes. The threat of U.S. sanctions is un-
likely to intimidate Iran into halting the development of natural
gas contracts.
It is difficult to distinguish between an "investment" contract
and a "service" contract. Suppose Turkey had agreed to provide
routine maintenance on an Iranian natural gas pipeline. Would
this constitute a prohibited "investment"? Guidelines on the im-
plementation of the ILSA published by the Department of State
suggest that a five step inquiry should be undertaken to determine
if something is an "investment" or "service." 160  First does the
provider of management services put capital at risk?161  Second,
does the provider receive a share of income or profits from the
development?162 Third, does the provider receive an equity stake
in the petroleum resources? 63 Fourth, does the rovider receive
compensation based on investment performance? Finally, does
the provider receive a share of the assets upon dissolution of the
enterprise?165  An affirmative answer to these questions suggest
158 See Bhushan Bahree, Iran Takes Economic Steps in Response to U.S. Curbs,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 14, 1996, at A3.
159 See, e.g., Robert Corzine, Turkmenistan Defies U.S. Over Iran Gas, FIN.
TIMEs, Jan. 21, 1997, at 4.
16 See 61 Fed. Reg. 66,067 (1996); State Department Issues Guidance Clarify-
ing Iran-Libya Sanctions Law, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1967 (Dec. 18, 1996)
[hereinafter Department Issues Guidance].
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that the contract is a prohibited investment. However, it is not
entirely clear how the U.S. government might resolve a case
where some, but not all, of the above questions are answered in
the affirmative.
3.6. Assessing the Investment and Trade Triggers Against Libya
What kind of transactions with respect to Libya will trigger
United States imposition of two or more sanctions? The ILSA
specifically states two prohibited activities regarding Libya. The
first, an investment trigger, is identical in virtually all respects to
the investment trigger for Iran. That is, it is illegal for any person
to (1) make an investment worth forty million dollars or more;
(2) with actual knowledge; (3) after the date of enactment of the
statute (August 5, 1995), that; (4) "directly and significantly" con-
tributes to the enhancement of Libya's ability to develop its pe-
troleum resources. 66 When the President determines that such
activity has occurred he must impose sanctions. The only differ-
ence between the Iranian and Libyan investment triggers is that a
waiver is not possible regarding the Libyan trigger. Thus en-
hanced sanctions are not a threat. That is, the President does not
have the authority to waive the Libyan investment trigger if a
country agrees to undertake substantial measures, including eco-
nomic sanctions, to inhibit Libya's efforts to support interna-
tional terrorism. The waiver applies only to the Iranian invest-
ment trigger.1 67  As a result, the "stick" to encourage other
countries to adopt measures against Libya, namely, the imposition
of the enhanced sanction, does not apply. The reason for this dif-
ference is not apparent from the statute or legislative history,
rather its explanation is most likely found in business reality. As
suggested earlier, European companies have far more extensive
dealings in the Libyan rather than the Iranian petroleum indus-
try.168  As a result, Congress probably realized there was little
hope of inducing a multilateral sanctions regime against Libya
(beyond the measures already adopted in United Nations resolu-
tions), and correspondingly, there was no point in applying the
enhanced sanction.
166 See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, S 5(b)(2),
110 Stat. 1541, 1543 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. S 1701 note).
167 See id. S 4(c).
168 See supra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
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The second prohibited activity regarding Libya concerns trade
in sensitive, particularly military, items. The President is re-
quired to impose two or more sanctions if a person engages in the
following transaction: (1) exports or other transfers to Libya, (2)
with actual knowledge, (3) goods, services, or technology ex-
ported to Libya are prohibited under United Nations Security
Council Resolutions 748 (adopted March 31, 1992) or
883 (adopted November 11, 1993), 169 and (4) these exports
"significantly and materially" contribute to Libya's ability to de-
velop its petroleum resources, maintain its aviation capabilities,
acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons or a destabilizing
number of advanced conventional weapons, or enhances Libya's
military capabilities.'70 While the prohibited transaction men-
tions petroleum resources and aviation, the clear thrust concerns
weapons. In essence, the trade trigger is a unilateral measure
adopted by the United States to reinforce the multilateral arms
embargo already implemented by the United Nations. Although
neither the ILSA nor its legislative history casts doubt on the sin-
cerity or efficacy of the U.N. Security Council measures, the very
existence of the trade trigger sanction must be seen as Congres-
sional skepticism of the willingness of some countries and compa-
nies to forsake profits and cease arms dealings with Libya. Essen-
tially, the trade trigger says to the world: "[tihe United States
agrees with the multilateral measures against Libya, but just to
make sure they are followed, the United States has its own secon-
dary boycott to keep everyone in line."
As with the investment trigger, which contains the flexible
but undefined language "directly and significantly contrib-
ute[s]," 17 1 the trade trigger uses the phrase "significantly and mate-
rially." 72 This undefined phrase gives the President considerable
room to maneuver in deciding whether to impose sanctions.
Likewise, both triggers contain the same mens rea requirement of
actual knowledge; thus the problems noted earlier regarding proof
of actual knowledge regarding the investment trigger are sure to
be repeated with respect to the trade trigger. An obvious ques-
tion is why Congress chose to include a trade trigger with respect
169 The relevant provisions of Resolution 748 are paragraphs 4(b) and 5.
The relevant provisions of Resolution 883 are paragraphs 5 and 6.
170 See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act S 5(b)(1).
171 See id. SS 5(a), 5(b)(2).
172 See id. S 5(b)(1).
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to Libya, but not with respect to Iran. After all, this choice
means that the secondary boycott with respect to Iran is narrowly
tailored to petroleum resource investments, whereas the secon-
dary boycott with respect to Libya includes such investments and
exports in a wide array of other goods and services. The legisla-
tive history explains the reason for the differential treatment of
the two countries:
In the case of Iran, the [House Ways and Means] Commit-
tee believes that it will be more effective to impose sanc-
tions on companies that invest in Iran's oil and gas re-
sources. This includes contracts for the development of
petroleum resources, contracts for the supervision and
guarantee of such development projects, and the acquisi-
tion of an ownership share or participation in the profits
of such projects. Without foreign investment, production
in Iran's oil and gas sector will fall, which will choke off
revenue to the government of Iran and thereby deny it re-
sources it employs to threaten the national security inter-
ests of the United States. These provisions do not deal
with financing or trade which would be far less effective,
create substantial difficulties in monitoring and cause un-
necessary adverse economic effects on U.S. businesses and
those of our allies. Similarly these provisions would
not.., reach purchases or equity interests in a non-Iranian
company subject to this... [the ILSA] unless the purchas-
ing party is covered by... [the provisions of the ILSA
dealing] with parent-subsidiary relationships.
However, the Committee did not believe it was wise to
include a requirement in the bill [H.R. 3107, the final ver-
sion of the ILSA] that the President sanction trade with
Iran (the so-called "trade trigger") because the cost to U.S. in-
terests of imposing such a broadly based secondary boycott
would be too high.
For example, monitoring international trade with Iran, es-
pecially in common goods like drill pipe and drill bits, would
be a difficult if not an unworkable task. The number of trade
transactions will be significantly higher than the number of
investment contracts and the flow of components impossible
to trace. The incidence of sanctions required by the trade trig-
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ger would be greater. The Committee believes it would be so
high as to cause serious damage to our relations with trusted
allies. By contrast an investment trigger is more workable
for the President and more potent when applied.
Equipped with an investment sanction the President is in a
better position to convince countries trading with Iran to
join the U.S. in denying Iran the opportunity to earn hard
currency from its petroleum resources.
Libya represents a different case by virtue of multilaterally
agreed trade sanctions adopted by the United Nations Security
[Council] Resolutions, which prohibit trade in weapons,
aviation equipment, and oil equipment significant to the
refining sector. For Libya, the bill establishes a mandatory
sanction framework for violations of the internationally
agreed trade regime.
3
In sum, the different economic histories and geopolitical cir-
cumstances account for the differential treatment of Iran and
Libya.
3.7. The Duration and Termination of Sanctions
Any sanction imposed under the ILSA must remain in effect
for a period of at least one year from the date on which it is im-
posed. 7 4 In general, the ILSA establishes a minimum two-year
duration for sanctions. 75 However, the ILSA allows for the
President to determine and certify to Congress that the sanctioned
person is no longer engaging in a prohibited transaction and that
the person has provided reliable assurances that he or she will not
knowingly violate the ILSA in the future.176 In this event, the
President may lift the sanctions, subject to the requirement that
they remain in effect for at least a year.'7 In effect, this require-
ment ensures that a minimum penalty is imposed, and prevents a
sanctioned person from skirting sanctions by temporarily ceasing
173 H.R. REP. No. 104-523(11) (1996),reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1311,
1317 (emphasis added).
I See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act S 9(b)(2).
'75 See id. S 9(b)(1).
176 See id. S 9(b)(2).
177 See id. S 9(b)(2).
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an illegal activity and providing a disingenuous assurance of future
compliance.
The ILSA lays out two further justifications for terminating
sanctions. Whereas the above justification for termination of
sanctions rests on the sanctioned person changing his behavior,
the remaining two justifications allow for termination of sanc-
tions if Iran and Libya reform their behavior. 178 First, with re-
spect to Iran, the requirement to impose sanctions will cease to
have force or effect if the President determines and certifies to
Congress that Iran no longer supports acts of international terror-
ism, and has abandoned its efforts to obtain nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons, and ballistic missiles and launchers. 179 Sec-
ond, with regard to Libya, the President need not impose sanc-
tions if he determines and certifies to Congress that Libya has sat-
isfied the requirements of United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 731 (adopted January 21, 1992), 748 (adopted March
31, 1992), and 883 (adopted November 
11, 1993). 18
Suppose the President refuses to make any of the three afore-
mentioned determinations and certifications that would allow for
termination of sanctions. Then sanctions may remain in place for
considerably longer than two years; however, how much longer is
not clear. The ILSA contains a sunset provision stating that the
ILSA ceases to be effective five years after the date of enactment.
Such a provision leads to the logical conclusion that the ILSA
would "expire" on August 5, 2001.181 However, one reading of
this sunset provision is that it precludes the imposition of new
sanctions after August 5, 2001, but not the continued enforcement
of sanctions imposed prior to that date. Thus, at least in theory,
there is no fixed termination period on sanctions.
This possibility raises an interesting problem: while "[a] de-
termination to impose sanctions" is not reviewable by any
court,18 2 could a sanctioned person challenge the continuation of
sanctions long after they have been imposed, if there are reason-
able grounds to believe their continuation is unwarranted? The
answer would seem to depend in part on how a court defines the
statutory words "to impose." Do they refer narrowly to the ini-
178 See id. S 8.
179 See id. S 8(a).
180 See id. S 8(b).
... See id. S 13(b).
182 See id. S 11.
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tial Presidential decision to impose sanctions, or do they also en-
compass a refusal by the President to determine and certify that
the criteria for terminating sanctions have been met? The pres-
ence of a sunset provision should not give false hope to critics of
the ILSA that after August 5, 2001 the ILSA will become legal his-
tory. Congress made its reason for the sunset provision clear in
the legislative history to the ILSA:
Because this bill [H.R. 3107, the final version of the ILSA]
deals with a difficult policy area, the [House Ways and
Means] Committee intends that it should not be perma-
nent. Five years is adequate time to gauge its effectiveness
at achieving the Committee's objectives. The Committee
believes it will be important for Congress to revisit the is-
sue in five years and to evaluate the behavior of Libya and
Iran and the effectiveness of this bill.1
3
In other words, a renewal of the ILSA appears to be just as
likely as its termination.
At the same time, the sunset provision should encourage
American petroleum companies, since the national security con-
siderations that gave rise to the ILSA are not invariant. At some
undetermined point in the future, possibly when new political
leaders take power in Iran and Libya, there will be no need for
sanctions and they will be abolished. In the meantime, nothing in
the ILSA prevents U.S. petroleum companies from keeping their
existing, and building new, business contacts in these countries.
As long as the ILSA remains in place, a farsighted American com-
pany should endeavor, to the extent politically possible, to
"network" in Iran and Libya. Indeed, Mobil Oil Corp., Amoco
Corp., and Conoco appear to be positioning themselves for the
inevitable post-sanctions era.
18 4
183 H.R. REP. No. 104-523(11), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1311, 1322.
184 See Daniel Pearl, U.S. Oil Firms Attend Conference in Iran, WALL ST. J.,
May 12, 1997, at 11 (discussing the presence of mid-level officials from Ameri-
can petroleum companies at an Iranian sponsored energy conference held in Is-
fahan during May 1997).
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3.8. The Waiver and Delay of Sanctions
The ILSA provides three circumstances under which sanctions
may be waived. First, the President can waive the imposition of a
sanction if a waiver "is important to the national interest of the
United States." 185  This waiver authority appears to be quite
broad; that is, it can be invoked for any sort of national interest,
not simply a national security interest.1
6
Circumstances in which the President might consider use
of this authority would include cases in which imposition
of sanctions would threaten U.S. intelligence sources and
methods, where a particular sanction would raise signifi-
cant issues under the international obligations of the U.S.,
and where international cooperation in pursuit of the goals
of the bill could be jeopardized, rather than assisted,
through unilateral U.S. action, or where sanctions would
lead to unacceptable costs to U.S. economic interests.
1 87
The last clause of the above-quoted legislative history indicates
that the President could find the imposition of sanctions contrary
to the national interest because sanctions would result in an unac-
ceptably high loss of sales or profits to U.S. businesses, or would
cost too many Americans their jobs.
The only real constraint on the President's national interest
waiver authority is that he must report his waiver determination
to Congress at least thirty days before the waiver takes effect.
188
Furthermore, the report given to Congress must discuss certain
specifically listed items, such as a description of the illegal transac-
tion, an explanation of America's efforts to cause the government
with primary jurisdiction over the sanctioned person to terminate
or penalize the illegal transaction, an estimate of the extent to
which the transaction helped Iran or Libya, and a discussion of
how the President would handle a repeat offense by the sanc-
tioned person.189
185 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act S 9(c) (emphasis added).
186 See id.
187 H.R. REP. No. 104-523(1), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1311, 1320-
21.
188 See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act S 9(c)(1).
189 See id. s 9(c)(2).
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Second, the President can waive sanctions if their imposition
would harm the ability of the U.S. government to procure critical
goods and services. For example, regarding defense procure-
ment, sanctions need not be imposed if the person to which sanc-
tions otherwise would be applied is a "sole source supplier" of an
"essential" defense article or service, and there is no "readily or
reasonably available" alternative source,191 or if the defense article
or service is being provided under an existing contract1 92 or de-
fense co-production agreement'93 and is "essential to the national
security" of the United States.1 94 Similarly, regarding non-defense
related items, the President can waive sanctions for a person sup-
plying spare or component parts,
195 or information technology, 6
that are "essential" to U.S. manufacturing. The President may
also waive sanctions for a person providing routine servicing and
maintenance on products that cannot be provided by another
"readily or reasonably available" person, or offering medicines
and humanitarian items9 .199 In brief, this waiver authority en-
sures that an American-imposed secondary boycott of Iran or
Libya does not wind up doing serious damage to the Pentagon or
to U.S. manufacturers.
Finally, as discussed earlier, nationals of a country may escape
sanctions if their country has "agreed to undertake substantial
measures, including economic sanctions, that will inhibit Iran's
efforts to" sponsor acts of international terrorism. 200 This waiver
possibility does not apply to Libya.20 '
" See id. S 5(0.
191 See id. S 5(f)(1)(B).
192 See id. S 5()(1(A).
193 See id. S 5((1)(C).
194 See id. S 5(f(1).
195 See id. 5()(4).
196 See id. S 5((5).
197 See id. S 5((5)(C).
198 See id. S 5(0(7).
199 See id. S 5(f)(4)-(7). (Note that the statute incorrectly numbers the items
in sub-section (0, onitting an item (5). The correct numbering should finish
with item (6), which should cover medicines).
200 See id. S 4(c)(1).
201 See id. (idicating that the application of the waiver applies only to Iran
and not to Libta)o
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As mentioned earlier, the President's decision to impose sanc-
tions is not reviewable by any court. 0 2 Consequently, it is im-
possible for a sanctioned person to delay imposition by attempt-
ing to bog down the President in a lawsuit. 2 3 However, the ILSA
sets forth circumstances, which are largely under the control of
the President and the government with primary jurisdiction over
the sanctioned person, whereby imposition may be delayed for up
to 180 days.2 04 By allowing for delayed imposition of sanctions,
Congress appears to have sought to soften the unilateral blow of
the ILSA.
Specifically, Congress "urges" the President to commence con-
sultations with the government that has primary jurisdiction over
a person who the President determines to be liable under the
ILSA "immediately" after he makes that determination.205 In or-
der to pursue these consultations, the President can delay imple-
mentation of sanctions for up to ninety days.20 6 Sanctions need
not be imposed if, following the consultations, the President de-
termines and certifies to Congress that "the government has taken
specific and effective actions, including.., the imposition of ap-
propriate penalties, to terminate the involvement of the foreign
person" in the illegal transaction.207 The President can delay im-
plementation of sanctions for an additional ninety days if he de-
termines and certifies to Congress that the government "is in the
process of taking" actions to terminate the involvement of the
foreign person in the illegal transaction.
20 8
4. ARE THE UNWTED STATES ACTIONS WORKING?
Clearly, the United States is not shy about enacting legislation
authorizing unilateral trade action against another country in the
interest of national security. There is, and is likely to continue to
be, a large and expanding body of instances where such actions are
taken. These invocations of statutory authority to undertake uni-
202 See id. S 11; H.R. REP. No. 523(1), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1296, 1306.
203 See H.R. REP. NO. 523(1).
204 See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act S 9(a)(2), 9(a)(3).
205 See id. S 9(a)(1).
206 See id. 9(a) (2).
207 See id.
20' See id. § 9(a)(3). The President is obligated to report to Congress the
status of consultations and any additional 90 day delays. See id.§ 9(a)(4).
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lateral trade action must be judged not simply from the perspec-
tive of its appropriateness in the post-Uruguay Round multilateral
trading system, and its consistency with the rules of that system.
After all, from this perspective, the judgment is rather obvious:
the language of GATT Article XXI is not a serious constraint on
the use of national security sanctions, and only the good faith of
WTO Members to avoid abusive invocation in the interests of the
multilateral system provides some measure of a GATT-based con-
straint.
Rather, a practical issue emerges from the earlier discussions
of the use of trade remedies in support of national security aims.
The United States, or any WTO Member country's, use of na-
tional security sanctions ultimately must be judged on the basis of
a bottom line question: does unilateral action in support of na-
tional security aims work? The empirical evidence discussed be-
low regarding unilateral action pursuant to statutes other than
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, suggests that
such action is not nearly as efficacious as its advocates would hope
or believe. Indeed, often it is self-destructive in terms of its effect
on the American economy.
One recent study, conducted by the Institute for International
Economics, examined the impact of unilateral American sanctions
imposed against twenty-six countries, including Cuba, Iran,
Libya, and Burma.209 The results of the study indicated that in
1995, the sanctions cost the United States between fifteen and
twenty billion dollars as a result of lost exports and higher priced
substitute import sources, and between 200,000 and 250,000 lost
export-related jobs.210 These self-inflicted wounds are sure to
worsen with the tightened unilateral ban on new American in-
vestment in Burma.
209 See Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al., U.S. Economic Sanctions: Their Impact
on Trade, Jobs, and Wages (Apr. 16, 1997) <http://www.iie.com/sanctnwp.
htm. > (available from the Institute for International Economics, Washington,
D.C.). For a general discussion of the study see Gary G. Yerkey,U.S. Sanctions
Against Other Countries Cost Exporters Up to $19 Billion, Study Says, 14 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 736 (Apr. 23, 1997) [hereinafter U.S. Sanctions Against Other
Countries; Robert Corzine & Nancy Dunne, U.S. Business Hits at Use of Unilat-
eral Sanctions, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1997, at 10; Institute for International Eco-nomics News Release, Economic Sanctions Reduce U.S. Exports by $15 Billion to
$20 Billion Annually (Apr. 16, 1997) <http://www.iie.com.sancprel.htm>
(available from the Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C.).
210 See Hufbauer, supra note 209.
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The day after a prohibition on new U.S. investments in
Burma was announced, the heads of several [non-
American] oil companies operating in the country sat
down to dinner at one of Rangoon's new luxury hotels.
They were salivating-but not because of the succulent
lobster on offer that evening.
Instead, they were discussing how to carve up explora-
tion rights held by U.S. companies, rights the U.S. com-
panies will most likely have to give up under the new
rules....
In the absence of the U.S. companies, "it's all there for
the taking. No project will not be taken up," says an ex-
ecutive with a Malaysian conglomerate.21'
Interestingly, the Institute for International Economics study
triggered the creation of a coalition of 440 American companies
and trade associations called "USAEngage." 212  The mission of
USAEngage is to "fight the imposition of unilateral sanctions by
the United States," 213" because, as its chairperson, Donald V. Fites
states, "the evidence is clear... [that] [t]he proliferation of U.S.
unilateral sanctions undermines American leadership and com-
petitiveness, costs U.S. jobs, and results in significant losses to the
economy."214 Recently, USAEngage supported legislation intro-
duced in Congress that would curb America's use of unilateral
sanctions.215  The legislation would require an assessment of the
economic impact and likelihood of success of sanctions before
they are imposed, and authorize the President to waive sanctions
if they are not in America's national interest.216 Any sanctions
imposed would be reviewed annually, and sunset after two years
unless renewed by Congress.
217
A second recent study, conducted by the National Association
of Manufacturers, reviewed sixty-one laws and executive actions
211 Ted Bardacke, Burma-The Sick Man Gets Sicker, FIN. TIMEs, Apr. 29,
1997, at 6.




216 See Nancy Dunne, U.S. Companies Plan Attack on Sanctions, FIN. TIMES,
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ordering unilateral American sanctions against thirty foreign
countries, including Cuba, Iran, Libya, and Burma that represent
forty-two percent of the world's population, or 2.3 billion poten-
tial consumers of American goods and services in export markets
worth $790 billion annually. 218 The upshot is that while these
sanctions may make some Americans feel safe, they are not effec-
tive. "[I]n only a handful of cases can it be argued that the sanc-
tions changed the behavior of the targeted governments."219
Thus, "[u]nilateral sanctions are little more than postage stamps
we send to other countries at the cost of thousands of American
jobs,"220 and they "give U.S. companies the 'stigma' of being unre-
liable trading partners."221 Unilateral trade actions rarely have
positive diplomatic results to offset the costs they impose on the
American economy. As of this writing, for instance, there have
been no significant, long-term changes in the fundamental policies
of the target countries. Libya's Qaddafi remains recalcitrant and
unapologetic. Like many sanction targets, he seems to be claim-
ing victim status, using the sanctions to attract both admiration
and sympathy from other Third World governments. The ILSA
may well prove to push Libya from "mere" recalcitrance to out-
218 See NATIONAL ASS'N OF MANUFACTURERS, A CATALOG OF NEW
U.S. UNILATERAL SANCTIONS FOR FOREIGN POLICY PURPOSES 1993-96
(1997).
219 Gary G. Yerkey, Unilateral Sanctions Target $790 Billion Potential Ex-
port Market a Year, Study Finds, 14 Int. Trade Rep. (BNA) 421 (Mar. 5, 1997)
1hereinafter Unilateral Sanctions Target $790 Billion].
220 Id. (quoting Jerry Jasinowski, President, National Association of
Manufacturers). For another study discussing the economic consequences on
the United States of unilateral sanctions, see PRESIDENT'S EXPORT COUNCIL,
UNILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: A REVIEW OF EXISTING SANCTIONS
AND THEIR IMPACTS ON U.S. ECONOMIC INTERESTS WITH RECOMMEN
DATIONS FOR POLICY AND PROCESS IMPROVEMENT (1997) (concluding that
the negative economic impact on the United States of unilateral sanctions could
be reduced if the United States better designed, implemented, and justified the
sanctions, and avoided extraterritorial measures and secondary boycotts).
221 Unilateral Sanctions Target $790 Billion, supra note 219, at 422
(paraphrasing Tracy O'Rourke, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Varian
Associates, Inc.). Yet another study, conducted by the American Chamber of
Commerce in Japan, concludes that "[o]nly 13 out of 45 U.S.-Japan trade
agreements signed since 1980 have succeeded in helping U.S. businesses pene-
trate the Japanese markets, while 10 accords were failures." Tashio Aritake
Mark Felsenthal, Only 13 Of 45 Accords With Japan Succeeded In Market Access,
Business Group Reports, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 76 Gan. 15, 1997). Many of
these accords were negotiated "under the gun" of an actual or threatened Sec-
tion 301 action.
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right defiance. As for Iran, the long-term effects of their 1997
elections on the relationship between Iran and the United States
remains to be seen. The call of the new Iranian President, Mu-
hammad Khatami, for a thoughtful dialogue with the United
States, and President Clinton's warm response, indicate signs of
improvement. m However, President Khatami seems to be at
odds with Iran's spiritual leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who
insists that "Islam will destroy the satanic sovereignty of the
west."M Even if Iran changes its behavior and American-Iranian
relations improve, it will be difficult if not impossible to argue the
ILSA was a primary force behind the improvement. Indeed, there
are at least three other pragmatic reasons why Iran could be seek-
ing better dealings with the Great Satan: (1) the need to deal with
declining oil revenues;224 (2) the need to deal with the widening
gap between the official exchange rate for its currency (the riyal)
and the black market rate n 5 and; (3) the hope for support in a
possible second war with Iraq. "
6
In sum, unilateral trade action persists despite considerable
evidence showing that it is not efficacious, and is often counter-
productive. Nevertheless, this evidence has not prodded U.S.
trade policy officials or jurists to rethink their fidelity to unilat-
eral trade actions, and is unlikely to do so in the foreseeable fu-
ture.
5. CONCLUSION
National security and international trade law are inextricably
linked. By virtue of GATT Article XXI, the link is written into
the constitution of modern international trade law. However,
2n See Nancy Dunne, U.S. Welcomes Iranian Call for Dialogue, FIN. TIMES,
Jan. 9, 1998, at 4; Robin Allen et al., U.S. Caution Over Call by Iranian President
for Better Relations, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1998, at 1; Kbatami's Iran, THE
ECONOMIST, Dec. 20, 1997, at 17.
m Allen, supra note 107, at 3; see also Robin Allen, Kbatami Rival De-
nounces U.S., FIN. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1998, at 3 (noting that a speech in the Iranian
parliament in favor of Ayatollah Khamenei prompted members of parliament
to shout "death to America").
224 See Robin Allen, Iran Admits Problem as Oil Revenues Fall, FIN. TIMES,
Jan. 12, 1998, at 3.
225 See Robin Allen, Kbatami Builds His PoliticalAutbority, FIN. TIMES, Jan.
15, 1998, at 4.
226 See Anthony E. Mitchell, Iran May Be Our Best Hope Against Iraq,WALL
ST. J., Jan. 29, 1998, at A18.
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this link is not one between two equal forces. Article XXI pro-
vides little effective restraint on WTO Members from enacting
national security sanctions legislation. Even in the international
trade law constitution, international trade law is subordinated to
national security.
The United States is exploiting this subordinate relationship.
In the post-Soviet Union, post-Red China era, it is threatened by
new groups of "bad guys," including state-sponsored terrorists and
rogue dictators, who are less monolithic and more diffuse than
the "old bad guys." The United States is meeting this threat by
deploying international trade law measures, such as secondary
boycotts, as a weapon. Unfortunately, America's allies and trade
partners are being hit by friendly fire. Neither supporters nor
critics of the weapon are entirely on target with their arguments.
The weapon is neither outrageous nor splendid. But one thing is
for sure, the weapon does not appear particularly effective. Since
the operation of secondary boycotts causes so much controversy,
and its results are so modest, the burden is on the U.S. trade pol-
icy makers to consider modifying, or even scuttling, the weapon.
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